SHA-3 Submission
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1 Introduction

The elliptic curve only hash (ECOH) algorithm is a submission to NIST’s SHA-3 competition. The ECOH algorithm is based on the MuHASH algorithm of Bellare and Micciancio [1].

1.1 Efficiency

For long messages, the ECOH algorithm is about a thousand times slower than SHA-1. Nevertheless, it does have some potential performance advantages over SHA-1.

- Incrementality: the ECOH hash of a message can be updated quickly, given a small change in the message and an intermediate value in the ECOH computation. Note MuHASH also has this property, but without requiring an intermediate value, in which case, the property can sometimes lead to an attack.

- Parallelizability: different parts of the ECOH computation can be done in parallel, because they do not depend on each other. Multiple CPUs are becoming common in personal computers.

- Carryless multiplication: ECOH works over binary fields, which are relatively slow on the CPU currently used in desktop because these CPUs only implement multiplication with carry operations. Intel recently announced that the upcoming AVX instructions will include carryless multiply operation.

Given the developments in desktop hardware towards parallelization and carryless multiplication, ECOH may in a few years be as fast as SHA-1 for long messages.

For short messages, ECOH is relatively slower, unless extensive tables are used. These tables are the same as one would use to speed up elliptic curve key generation (which is use in elliptic curve key agreement and signature generation).

1.2 Security

MuHASH, upon which ECOH is based, has not been successfully attacked. The closest attack has been Wagner’s attack [12] on AdHASH, a hash function faster and simpler than MuHASH, which Bellare and Micciancio [1] introduced in the same paper as MuHASH. Assuming MuHASH continues to resist attacks, it would seem that attack against ECOH may need to exploit the difference between ECOH and MuHASH. The main difference is that where MuHASH applies a random oracle, ECOH applies a padding function.

Assuming random oracles, Bellare and Micciancio [1] proved that finding a collision in MuHASH implies solving the discrete logarithm problem. For practicality, ECOH does not use a random oracle. It is shown here that finding low degree solutions to certain multivariate polynomial equations derived from Semaev’s summation polynomials [9] allows one to find collisions in ECOH. Therefore, the security of ECOH is not directly related to the discrete logarithm problem.

Semaev [10] first formulated these summation polynomial equations over binary field and proposed the problem of finding low degree solutions of them, in the context of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm over a Koblitz elliptic curve. Gaudry [4] used summation polynomials to the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem over a cubic extension field in time faster than square root.
of the curve size asymptotically. Note that Gaudry used solutions belonging a subfield, not merely low degree solutions in a binary field.

Therefore, Semaev’s problem for summation polynomial fields has not so far been a given efficient algorithm to solve. Semaev [10] notes that Coppersmith’s algorithm does something analogous for prime fields: it finds small solutions to certain small degree polynomials, though not necessarily summation polynomials. That Gaudry successfully applied to Semaev’s idea to attack the elliptic curve discrete logarithm over cubic extension fields could be interpreted to mean that the original problem of applying them to Koblitz curves and other prime degree binary fields did not admit so easy a solution. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that this problem has not been nearly as well-studied as the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.

1.3 A More Cautious Variant

In a generalization of ECOH given here, an option is available that interferes with the formulation of the summation polynomial in terms of low degree solutions. Rather, the solutions instead must carry some intrinsic redundancy not easily expressible in the underlying field. The aim is to render the equations non-algebraic. Such enhancements may slow ECOH somewhat. Also, although these enhancements are simple enough to state, the effect upon security analysis is more complicated. Sometimes such an apparent complexity in the security analysis adds to security, but occasionally it does not, that is, it is sometimes does not add any computational complexity for the adversary.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$H$</th>
<th>Output of the hash function, a bit string</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>Length of $H$, in bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M$</td>
<td>The input message to be hashed, a bit string</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$mlen$</td>
<td>Length of $M$, in bits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$m$</td>
<td>Length in bits of finite field elements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$q$</td>
<td>Field size (note $q = 2^m$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$blen$</td>
<td>Length of message blocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$ilen$</td>
<td>Length of index blocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$clen$</td>
<td>Length of counter blocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i$</td>
<td>Index of message blocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$j$</td>
<td>Number of zero bits used to pad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>Padded message (sometimes also order of $G$)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$k$</td>
<td>Number of padded message blocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$E$</td>
<td>Elliptic curve, including finite field and its representation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$G$</td>
<td>A fixed point on the elliptic curve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N_i$</td>
<td>A substring of $N$ of length $blen$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$I_i$</td>
<td>A bit string of length $ilen$ representing integer $i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$O_i$</td>
<td>A bit string of length $blen + ilen$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$X_i$</td>
<td>A bit string representing the x-coordinate of point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_i$</td>
<td>An elliptic curve point</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$x_i$</td>
<td>A finite field element, the x-coordinate of $P_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y_i$</td>
<td>A finite field element, the y-coordinate of $P_i$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Q$</td>
<td>An elliptic curve point</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Common variables

## 2 Glossary

The elliptic curve operations used in ECOH are those used in FIPS 186-3 and [11]. Some familiarity with either of these standards is assumed. In particular, familiarity with finite fields of characteristic two is assumed and with elliptic curves defined over these fields, having equation of the form $y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$.

Table 1 defines the meaning of some common variables appearing in the specification of ECOH. Table 2 defines some operators and constants appearing in this specification, but variable names are not included.

| $\parallel$ | Concatenation of bit strings. For example $0011101\parallel110110 = 0011101110110$. |
| $\mid$ | Divisibility of integers or polynomials. For example, $2\mid4$ and $x\mid x^2 + x$ are true, but $2\mid3$ is false. |
| $\oplus$ | Bit-wise exclusive of bit strings, which must be equal length. For example, $001111 \oplus 110110 = 110001$. |
### Glossary

- **⊕^k_{i=0}** Bit-wise exclusive of a sequence or array of bit strings. For example, if \( B_0 = 00 \), \( B_1 = 01 \) and \( B_2 = 11 \), then \( \bigoplus^2_{i=0} B_i = 00 \oplus 01 \oplus 11 = 10 \).

- **0^j** Bit string of length \( j \) consisting of all zero bits. For example, \( 0^7 = 0000000 \).

- **1** Bit string of length 1 consisting of a single one bit, or the integer, or finite field element, or polynomial over a finite field.

- **\( \mathcal{O} \)** The point at infinity on an elliptic curve. Defined to be the identity element of the elliptic curve group.

- **(,)** Coordinates of a point. For example, \((0, 1) = (x, y) = (0, 1) \) is a point on the curve \( y^2 + xy = x^3 + 1 \).

- **+** Integer addition, finite field addition, finite field polynomial addition, or elliptic curve addition, depending on context. For example: \( 2 + 3 = 5; \ x + x = 0; \ (0, 1) + (0, 1) = \mathcal{O} \).

- **\( \sum^k_{i=0} \)** Addition of elliptic curve points indexed from \( i = 0 \) to \( i = k \).

- **\( a^b \)** Integer exponentiation, finite field exponentiation, or polynomial exponentiation, depending on the type of \( a \). In all cases, \( b \) is non-negative integer. For example, \( 2^3 = 8 \), and \( (x + 1)^3 = x^3 + 3x^2 + 3x + 1 \).

- **/** Rational number division or finite field division or polynomial division. For example, \( 6/2 = 3, 3/2 = 1.5, \) and \( (x^2 + x)/(x + 1) = x \).

- **\( a/b \)** Alternative notation for division, that is, \( a/b \).

- **\[ \]** \( [x] \) is largest integer not exceeding \( x \). For example, \( [3/2] = 1 \) and \( [5] = 5 \).

- **\[ \]** \( \lfloor x \rfloor \) is smallest integer not less than \( x \). For example, \( \lfloor 3/2 \rfloor = 2, \) and \( \lfloor 5 \rfloor = 5 \).

- **\( \mathbb{F}_q \)** Finite field with \( q \) elements.

- **\( \langle \mathcal{G} \rangle \)** The cyclic subgroup of elliptic curve group generated consisting of all elements \( n \mathcal{G} \) for integers \( n \).

- **\( A_i \)** A sequence or array of bit strings or elliptic curve points, indexed by \( i \), where \( A \) is some variable name, which may also have a value when use alone. For example, perhaps \( B_0 = 000 \) and \( B_1 = 110 \) and \( B_2 = 010 \) could be a sequence of bit strings, whereas \( B \) may also indicate 0001.

- **\( x(P) \)** The integer whose bit string representation, padded with sufficiently many zeros on the left, equals the bit string representation of the \( x \)-coordinate of the elliptic curve point \( P \). An exceptional case is that \( x(\mathcal{O}) \) is defined to be 0.

- **\( x \mod m \)** The remainder obtained when dividing \( x \) by \( m \). When \( x \) and \( m \) are integers, it is unique integer \( r \) such that \( 0 \leq r < m \) and \( x = qm + r \) for some integer \( q \), which can also be expressed as \( x - m \lfloor x/m \rfloor \).
Finite field elements are represented as bit string using a polynomial basis representation. Table 3 gives example fields, irreducible polynomials for fields, and example elements in the field. The bit string representations of the field elements are given. Also given is the integer whose bit string representation, when padded with sufficiently zeros on the left, equals the bit string representation of the field element. Finally the hexadecimal representation is given, which is obtained by padding the bit string on the left with zeros until the length is a multiple of 8, and then converting to hexadecimal.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field size</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>128</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irreducible polynomial</td>
<td>$t^3 + t + 1$</td>
<td>$t^7 + t + 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example field element</td>
<td>$t + 1$</td>
<td>$t^4 + t^3 + t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bit string representation</td>
<td>011</td>
<td>0011010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integer representation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hexadecimal representation</td>
<td>03</td>
<td>1A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Finite field representation example
3 Specification

The four ECOH algorithms have parameters as specified in Table 4. The four ECOH algorithms are specified by the pseudocode in Table 5 with the parameters above substituted as needed. The maximum bit length of a message that can be hashed is $2^{ilen} - 1$. For convenience, separate pseudocode is given for each of the four ECOH algorithms in Tables 6–9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hash</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>E and G</th>
<th>m</th>
<th>blen</th>
<th>ilen</th>
<th>clen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOH-224</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>B-283</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOH-256</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>B-283</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOH-384</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>B-409</td>
<td>409</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOH-512</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>B-571</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Parameters for unified ECOH

Note that the four submitted ECOH algorithms are also instantiations of a generalized ECOH algorithm (§5), for which certain values of the parameters (§5.1) are selected.

| 1. Let $N = M || 1^j 0^j$, with $j$ chosen to be the smallest nonnegative integer such that the length of $N$ is divisible by $blen$. |
| 2. Parse $N$ into blocks $N_0, \ldots, N_{k-1}$ each of length $blen$ bits. |
| 3. Let $O_i = N_i || I_i$, where $I_i$ is the $ilen$-bit representation of the integer $i$, for $i$ from 0 to $k - 1$. |
| 4. Let $O_k = (\bigoplus_{i=0}^{k-1} N_i) || I_{mlen}$ where $I_{mlen}$ is the $ilen$-bit representation of the bit length $mlen$ of the message $M$. |
| 5. Let $X_i = (0^{m-(blen+ilen+clen)} || O_i || 0^{elen}) \oplus C_i$ where $C_i$ is the bit string of length $m$ representing the smallest nonnegative integer $c$ such that $X_i$ represents the x-coordinate $x_i$ of an element of $\langle G \rangle$. |
| 6. Let $P_i = (x_i, y_i)$ be such that the rightmost bit of $y_i/x_i$ equals the leftmost bit of $N_i$. |
| 7. Let $Q = \sum_{i=0}^{k} P_i$. |
| 8. Output the $n$-bit representation of $\lfloor x(Q + \lfloor x(Q)/2 \rfloor G)/2 \rfloor \mod 2^n$. |

Table 5: Unified Pseudocode for ECOH

Note that the four submitted ECOH algorithms are also instantiations of a generalized ECOH algorithm (§5), for which certain values of the parameters (§5.1) are selected.
3.1 ECOH-224

ECOH-224 uses the curve B-283, including generator point $G$, with parameters $(\text{blen}, \text{ilen}, \text{clen}) = (128, 64, 64)$.

1. Let $N = M\|1\|0^j$, with $j$ chosen to be the smallest nonnegative integer such that the length of $N$ is divisible by 128.
2. Parse $N$ into blocks $N_0, \ldots, N_{k-1}$ each of length 128 bits.
3. Let $O_i = N_i\|I_i$, where $I_i$ is the 64-bit representation of the integer $i$, for $i$ from 0 to $k-1$.
4. Let $O_k = (\bigoplus_{i=0}^{k-1} N_i)\|I_{mlen}$ where $I_{mlen}$ is the 64-bit representation of the bit length $mlen$ of the message $M$.
5. Let $X_i = (0^{27}\|O_i\|0^{64}) \oplus C_i$ where $C_i$ is the bit string of length 283 representing the smallest nonnegative integer $c$ such that $X_i$ represents the x-coordinate $x_i$ of an element of $\langle G \rangle$.
6. Let $P_i = (x_i, y_i)$ be such that the rightmost bit of $y_i/x_i$ equals the leftmost bit of $N_i$.
7. Let $Q = \sum_{i=0}^{k} P_i$.
8. Output the 224-bit representation of $\lfloor x(Q + \lfloor x(Q)/2 \rfloor G)/2 \rfloor \mod 2^{224}$.

Table 6: Pseudocode for ECOH-224
3.2 ECOH-256

ECOH-256 uses the curve B-283, including generator point \( G \), with parameters \((blen, ilen, clen) = (128, 64, 64)\).

1. Let \( N = M \| 1 \| 0^j \), with \( j \) chosen to be the smallest nonnegative integer such that the length of \( N \) is divisible by 128.

2. Parse \( N \) into blocks \( N_0, \ldots, N_{k-1} \) each of length 128 bits.

3. Let \( O_i = N_i \| I_i \), where \( I_i \) is the 64-bit representation of the integer \( i \), for \( i \) from 0 to \( k - 1 \).

4. Let \( O_k = (\bigoplus_{i=0}^{k-1} N_i) \| I_{mlen} \) where \( I_{mlen} \) is the 64-bit representation of the bit length \( mlen \) of the message \( M \).

5. Let \( X_i = (0^{27} \| O_i \| 0^{64}) \oplus C_i \) where \( C_i \) is the bit string of length 283 representing the smallest nonnegative integer \( c \) such that \( X_i \) represents the x-coordinate \( x_i \) of an element of \( \langle G \rangle \).

6. Let \( P_i = (x_i, y_i) \) be such that the rightmost bit of \( y_i/x_i \) equals the leftmost bit of \( N_i \).

7. Let \( Q = \sum_{i=0}^{k} P_i \).

8. Output the 256-bit representation of \( \lfloor x(Q + \lfloor x(Q)/2 \rfloor G)/2 \rfloor \mod 2^{256} \).

Table 7: Pseudocode for ECOH-256
### 3.3 ECOH-384

ECOH-384 uses the curve B-409, including generator point $G$, with parameters $(blen, ilen, clen) = (192, 64, 64)$.

1. Let $N = M \| 1 \| 0^j$, with $j$ chosen to be the smallest nonnegative integer such that the length of $N$ is divisible by 192.

2. Parse $N$ into blocks $N_0, \ldots, N_{k-1}$ each of length 192 bits.

3. Let $O_i = N_i \| I_i$, where $I_i$ is the 64-bit representation of the integer $i$, for $i$ from 0 to $k - 1$.

4. Let $O_k = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{k-1} N_i \| I_{mlen}$ where $I_{mlen}$ is the 64-bit representation of the bit length $mlen$ of the message $M$.

5. Let $X_i = (0^89 \| O_i \| 0^{64}) \oplus C_i$ where $C_i$ is the bit string of length 409 representing the smallest nonnegative integer $c$ such that $X_i$ represents the $x$-coordinate $x_i$ of an element of $\langle G \rangle$.

6. Let $P_i = (x_i, y_i)$ be such that the rightmost bit of $y_i/x_i$ equals the leftmost bit of $N_i$.

7. Let $Q = \sum_{i=0}^{k} P_i$.

8. Output the 384-bit representation of $\lfloor x(Q + \lfloor x(Q)/2 \rfloor G)/2 \rfloor \mod 2^{384}$.

| Table 8: Pseudocode for ECOH-384 |
3.4 ECOH-512

ECOH-512 uses the curve B-571, including generator point $G$, with parameters $(blen, ilen, clen) = (256, 128, 128)$. It can hash messages of bit length up to $2^{128} - 1$.

1. Let $N = M||1||0^j$, with $j$ chosen to be the smallest nonnegative integer such that the length of $N$ is divisible by 256.

2. Parse $N$ into blocks $N_0, \ldots, N_{k-1}$ each of length 256 bits.

3. Let $O_i = N_i||I_i$, where $I_i$ is the 128-bit representation of the integer $i$, for $i$ from 0 to $k-1$.

4. Let $O_k = (\bigoplus_{i=0}^{k-1})N_i||I_{mlen}$ where $I_{mlen}$ is the 128-bit representation of the bit length $mlen$ of the message $M$.

5. Let $X_i = (0^{59}||O_i||0^{128}) \oplus C_i$ where $C_i$ is the bit string of length 571 representing the smallest nonnegative integer $c$ such that $X_i$ represents the $x$-coordinate $x_i$ of an element of $\langle G \rangle$.

6. Let $P_i = (x_i, y_i)$ be such that the rightmost bit $y_i/x_i$ equals the leftmost bit of $N_i$.

7. Let $Q = \sum_{i=0}^{h} P_i$.

8. Output the 512-bit representation of $\lfloor x(Q + \lfloor x(Q)/2 \rfloor G)/2 \rfloor \mod 2^{512}$.

Table 9: Pseudocode for ECOH-512
4 Efficiency Analysis

In this section, the efficiency of ECOH is discussed by way of some estimates and experiments with the submitted reference and optimized implementations.

4.1 Reference Implementation

The reference implementation uses well-known elliptic curve arithmetic algorithms as surveyed in [7]. It is more than a thousand times slower than an implementation of SHA-1 on the same platform.

About three quarters of the time that the reference implementation requires to compute an ECOH digest of a long message is spent computing inverses of elements in the field over which the elliptic curve is defined.

On average, three inversions must be computed for each message block. Some of these inversions are needed to search for a point on the curve corresponding to the message block. On average, two inversions are needed to find this point. Once the point is found, it must be added into an accumulator. The reference implementation uses affine coordinates, in which the addition formula includes an inversion.

Affine coordinates were chosen over projective coordinates, because affine coordinates run faster on current Intel processors. More specifically, in binary fields, the cost $M$ of finite field multiplication and the cost $I$ of finite field inversion have a ratio $I/M \approx 7$. The reason that projective coordinates were not used is that, although their addition formula generally avoid an inversion, they require many more multiplication operations, typically eight or more, which is more expensive than an inversion operation in the reference implementation.

After inversions the bulk of the remaining computation time in the reference implementation on long messages is spent performing finite field multiplication. Most of this time is spent on binary polynomial multiplication, which is implemented using combing. The reference implementation spends relatively little time on modular reduction, polynomial addition, computation of the trace and half-trace. Traces are implementation by examining fixed bits of the polynomial basis representation. Half-traces are computed with table lookups and polynomial addition.

For short messages, the scalar multiplication in the postprocessing requires relatively more time.

4.2 Optimized Implementation

The optimized implementation is about three times faster than the reference implementation, on the platforms in which it was tested. The optimized implementation is based on the reference implementation with improvements made in certain functions.\footnote{Better optimization may have been possible starting from scratch rather than from the reference implementation.} The main differences between the reference and optimized implementation are in the algorithms and coding used for computing inverses and field multiplication.

Inversion in the reference implementation is computed using a variant of the Euclidean algorithm. This variant is tailored for binary fields in that a full polynomial division is not computed, but rather only the degree of the quotient is computed. Inversion in the optimized implementation uses a better algorithm, known as the almost inverse algorithm. Among other reasons, the almost algorithm is faster because it does not compute a difference of degrees, but rather only does a
comparison of degrees. Use of a better inverse algorithm is a major part of why the optimized implementation is faster.

Another aspect of the optimized implementation is more careful field specific coding for the both the field inversion and multiplication operations.

Note the optimization in the optimized implementation focused on long messages. In particular, acceleration of the scalar multiplication using larger tables was not done.

4.3 Assembly Optimization

Hardware specific assembly optimization can sometimes result in more efficient executables than compiled C source code.

The submitted reference and optimized implementations do not use any specific assembly. That is, they are written entirely on C, and rely entirely on the compiler for assembling.

Hand assembly for specific platforms should make the ECOH faster. It is difficult to estimate the speedup, because it depends on both the compiler and the hardware.

4.4 Simultaneous Inversion

Simultaneous inversion, introduced by Peter Montgomery, trades \( k \) inversions for 1 inversion and \( 3(k - 1) \) multiplications. Considering that \( I/M > 3 \) and that most of the time for performing ECOH is spent on inversion, simultaneous inversion should yield a speed up for ECOH.

Simultaneous inversion is not implemented in the submission. The theoretical benefit of simultaneous inversion, for long messages, is to reduce one unit of time to \( \frac{3}{I/M} - \frac{3}{4} + \frac{1}{4} \), assuming fraction of the time spent on inversion if \( \frac{3}{4} \) and that \( k \), the number of inversion done simultaneously, is chosen to be sufficiently large. Taking \( I/M = 7 \) for the reference implementation, make ECOH a little less than twice as fast. That said, however, simultaneous inversion has some overhead costs, of determining which inversion to do simultaneously.

For the optimized implementation, estimate indicate \( I/M \approx 2 \), which may be artificially low, perhaps due to inaccuracy of the timing methods we used, or because of the greater effort spent on reducing \( I \) compared to \( M \). With such a low \( I/M \) ratio, simultaneous inversion is not expect to improve the optimized implementation, at least as is.

4.5 AVX instructions

Intel recently announced Advanced Vector Extensions (AVX), which are a new set of instructions to be added to its upcoming processors. Included in AVX is an instruction PCLMULQDQ which may be useful for making elliptic curve cryptography over binary fields more efficient.

Gueron and Kounavis \cite{6} suggest an approximate 21 or 66 times speed up of scalar multiplication. To get this, they assumed a reasonable cost of the PCLMULQDQ instruction. They compare projective coordinates implemented with PCLMULQDQ to affine coordinates implemented with combing multiplication and a variant of the Euclidean algorithm.

Since projective coordinates replace one inversion with 8 multiplies one may infer that they find \( I/M \approx (8)(21) = 168 \). This is clearly a crude estimate, but it does strongly suggest that with AVX, the ratio \( I/M \) will become considerably larger.

With so large a value \( I/M \), it makes much more sense to use projective coordinates and simultaneous inversion.
Given the estimates above, ECOH would be 25 times faster than the reference implementation if implemented with AVX and simultaneous inversion.

4.6 Parallelization

The ECOH algorithm is parallelizable in the following ways:

- the search and recovery of the term points may be done in parallel,
- computing the checksum may be done in parallel,
- computing the total point from the term points may be done in parallel.
- computing the scalar multiply may be done in parallel, if a sufficiently large table is used.

The amount of parallelization possible in ECOH depends on the hardware used and on the message size.

It should be noted that simultaneous inversion requires a serial sequence of multiplication operations. For short messages, therefore, it may be possible to benefit from both simultaneous inversion and parallelization of the point searching, recovery and additions. For longer messages, though grouping a moderate number of simultaneous inversion together should capture almost all of the benefit of simultaneous inversion. Since there will be many of these grouped inversion, the benefits of parallelization can be obtained by doing these multiple simultaneous inversions in parallel.

For example, if the hardware permits 40 parallel operations and quick AVX binary polynomial multiplication operations, then for sufficiently long messages where simultaneous inversions gives 25 times speedup over the reference implementation, then the parallelism will give another 40 times speedup, for a final speedup of 1000 times. In this case, ECOH would have a speed comparable to SHA-1.

4.7 Incrementality

In situations where small changes to the message are likely to be needed for hashing, specifically in-place substitution of bits, or truncation of the final bits, or extension of further bits, then the following incrementality feature of ECOH may useful.

The incremental functionality was not included in the reference or optimized implementation. We estimate that for message changes involving fewer than 0.1% of the blocks, then using an incremental functionality to recompute the hash would be faster than computing the SHA-1. If incrementality is combined AVX instruction (and maybe with simultaneous inversion), or parallelization, then the proportion of changed blocks can be higher.
5 Generalization of ECOH

This section is a generalization of the ECOH algorithm. In the event that NIST finds that ECOH is suitable for SHA-3 except for some minor deficiencies, then it is suggested that some version of the generalized ECOH specified in this section be considered.

5.1 Generalized ECOH Parameters

Generalized ECOH has the parameters list below. Parameters listed as required are needed to comply with certain SHA-3 requirements, or to ensure security, or at least to provide some concrete definition. Parameters listed as recommended include those used in the submitted version of ECOH, as specified in §3. Many of the parameters can be made higher to strengthen the security, which may be desirable for SHA-3.

Conversely, lowering some of the parameters, especially below the recommended values, should result in a weakened version of ECOH, whose security is easier to ascertain. For example, using a small elliptic curve may make finding a collision possible. The computational cost for finding collisions in such weakened version of ECOH may be interpolated to estimate the computational cost of finding a collision in the submitted version of ECOH or the generalized form of ECOH.

- Output length \(n\) bits.
  - Required: \(n \in \{224, 256, 384, 512\}\).
- Binary field degree \(m\).
  - Required: \(m > n\).
  - Recommended: \(m \in \{283, 409, 571\}\)
- Binary field representation: a bijection \(\rho : \mathbb{F}_{2^m} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m\).
  - Recommended: polynomial basis representation,
  - Recommended: left bits are highest degree bits,
  - Recommended: minimal Hamming weight irreducible polynomial basis representation,
  - Recommended: Representations given in FIPS 186-2 for B-283, B-409, B-571.
- Elliptic curve parameters \(a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}\).
  - Recommended: the NIST curves B-283, B-409 and B-571, as appropriate with the other parameters.
- Elliptic curve generator \(G \in E(\mathbb{F}_{2^m})\) (also known as base point).
  - Required: the cyclic subgroup \(\langle G \rangle\) generated by \(G\) of the elliptic curve \(E : y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b\) must not be such that the discrete log problem in \(\langle G \rangle\) is known to be solvable with computation less than the equivalent \(2^{n/2}\) elliptic curve operations.
  - Recommended: the value of \(G\) including B-283, B-409 and B-571, as appropriate with other parameters.
• Elliptic curve subgroup index $h$.
  – Requirement: the order of $G$ is $|E(\mathbb{F}_{2^m})|/h$.
  – Recommended: $|E(\mathbb{F}_{2^m})|/h$ is prime. (In which case, $h$ is also called the cofactor.)
  – Recommended: $h = 2$.

• Message block size $blen$.
  – Required: $blen \geq 96$.
  – Recommended: $blen = 128$ if $n \in \{224, 256\}$, $blen = 192$ if $n = 384$, $blen = 256$ if $n = 512$.
  – Recommended: $blen \geq 128$.
  – Recommended: $32 | blen$.

• Index block size $ilen$.
  – Required: $ilen \geq 64$.
  – Recommended: $ilen = 64$ unless $n = 512$, then $ilen = 128$.
  – Recommended: $32 | ilen$.

• Counter block size $clen$.
  – Required: $clen \geq 64$.
  – Recommended: $clen = 64$, unless $n = 512$, then $clen = 128$.
  – Recommended: $32 | clen$.

• Bits dropped before integer conversion: subset of $\{0, 1, \ldots, m - 1\}$, corresponding to radix significance.
  – Recommended: (for use with polynomial representation) $\{0\}$, where 0 indicates the degree of the bit (so this the rightmost or last bit). (If the bits are counted from the left, then this is bit $m - 1$.)

• Unsigned integer encoding:
  – Required: as bit strings of a given length, with lower radix bits on the right.
  – Recommended: consistency with the polynomial basis representation, so the higher degree bits correspond to higher radix bits.

• Bits kept after integer conversion to hash output: subset of $\{0, 1, \ldots, m - 2\}$, corresponding to radix significance.
  – Recommended: the $n$ least significant $\{0, 1, \ldots, n - 1\}$.

• Shift factor $\beta$.
  – Required: $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$. 
– Recommended: $\beta = 1$.

- Tail obfuscator $\omega$.
  – Required: $\omega \in \{0, 1\}$.
  – Required: if $\omega = 1$, then $\text{blen} \geq 128$.
  – Recommended: $\omega = 0$.

- Encryptor flag $\epsilon$.
  – Required: $\epsilon \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$.
  – Recommended: $\epsilon = 0$.

- Addition flag: $\alpha$.
  – Required: $\alpha \in \{0, 1\}$.
  – Recommended: $\alpha = 0$.

5.2 Generalized ECOH Operations

In this section, the generalized ECOH algorithm is specified in small modular pieces. An outline of the pieces is given below and grouped into phases in such a way to facilitate further discussion.

1. Input
2. Bit string preprocessing phase
   (a) Padding
   (b) Parsing
   (c) Indexing
   (d) Tailing
3. Elliptic curve preprocessing phase,
   (a) Searching
   (b) Recovering
4. Elliptic curve main summation phase
   (a) Summing
5. Elliptic curve postprocessing phase
   (a) Converting
   (b) Multiplying
   (c) Shifting
6. Bit string postprocessing phase
(a) Converting
(b) Selecting

7. Output

5.2.1 Input
The input to ECOH is a message \( M \), which is a bit string of arbitrary length. The length of \( M \) in bits is denoted by \( mlen \).

5.2.2 Padding
Message \( M \) is padded with a single 1 bit and then with the minimal number of 0 bits needed to obtain a bit string whose length is a multiple of \( blen \) to obtain a bit string \( N \) that is the padded version of the input bit string \( M \). Using \( \parallel \) to indicate bit string concatenation, \( 0^j \) to indicate a string of length \( j \) all of whose bits are 0, and \( (a \mod b) \) to indicate the remainder of \( a \) divided by \( b \), then the formula for \( N \) may also be expressed as:

\[
N = M \parallel 1 \parallel 0^{((-1 - mlen) \mod blen)}
\]  

(1)

Note that the length \( N \) as a bit string may be expressed as:

\[
blen \left\lceil \frac{1 + mlen}{blen} \right\rceil
\]  

(2)

where \( \lceil x \rceil \) indicates the smallest integer \( i \geq x \). Let \( k = \left\lceil \frac{1 + mlen}{blen} \right\rceil \), so that the bit length of \( N \) is \( k(\text{blen}) \). We may refer to \( k \) as the block count, if needed.

5.2.3 Parsing
The padded message \( N \) is parsed into \( k \) blocks, each a bit string of length \( \text{blen} \) bits. The blocks are indicated as \( N_i \) where \( i \) is an integer and \( 0 \leq i < k \). Using concatenation notation \( \parallel \) we will have that

\[
N = N_0 \parallel N_1 \parallel \ldots \parallel N_{k-1}.
\]  

(3)

Using array indexing of bit strings, where \( B[j] \) is the bit of the bit string \( B \) at a distance of \( j \) bit positions from the leftmost bits of \( B \) (so that \( B[0] \) is the leftmost bit, for example), then \( N_i \) may be expressed as the unique bit string of length \( \text{blen} \) such that:

\[
N_i[j] = N[j + i(\text{blen})]
\]  

(4)

for all integers \( j \) with \( 0 \leq j < \text{blen} \).

5.2.4 Indexing
Each parsed block \( N_i \) for integers \( 0 \leq i < k \) is processed to obtain an indexed block \( O_i \) as follows

\[
O_i = N_i \parallel I_i
\]  

(5)

where \( I_i \) is the bit string of length \( \text{ilen} \) representing the unsigned integer \( i \). We refer to \( O_i \) as a body indexed block.
5.2.5 Tailing

Let

$$N_k = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{k-1} N_i = N_0 \oplus N_1 \oplus \cdots \oplus N_{k-1}$$

(6)

where $\oplus$ indicates the bit-wise exclusive operation upon bit strings. Let

$$O_k = N_k \| I_{\text{mlen}}$$

(7)

where $I_{\text{mlen}}$ is the bit string of length $\text{ilen}$ representing the length $\text{mlen}$ of the original input message $M$. Note well that $I_{\text{mlen}} \neq I_k$ (unless $\text{mlen} = 1$) so the index portion of $O_k$ generally does not represent the integer $k$, as one might erroneously assume if one just interpolated from the index portions of the previous values $O_i$. In other words, the index portion of $O_k$ is higher as an integer by a factor of about $\text{blen}$ than the index portion of $O_{k-1}$. We refer to $O_k$ as the tail indexed block, and to $N_k$ as the checksum.

If $\omega = 1$ (which requires $\text{blen} \geq 127$), then the leftmost 127 bits of $N_k$ are not zero, then they are modified as follows. They are first converted to an integer $w$ (which will necessarily be nonzero). The polynomial $f(x) \equiv x^w \mod x^{127} + x + 1$ is computed. This is a polynomial of degree at most 126. This is converted to a bit string $W$ of length 127 bits, where the leftmost bit is the coefficient of $x^{126}$ and so on. Then the leftmost 127 bits of $N_k$ are replaced by $W$.

Indexed block refers to either a body indexed block or a tail indexed block.

5.2.6 Searching

For each indexed block $N_i$, the following loop is executed. An integer counter variable $c$ is initialized to 0. The variable $c$ will be incremented at each stage of the loop. The following bit string length $m$ is initialized:

$$X = 0^{m-(\text{blen}+\text{ilen}+\text{clen})} \| O_i \| 0^{\text{clen}}$$

(8)

At each iteration of the loop, the counter $c$ is represented as a bit string $C$ of length $m$ bits. Then the bit string

$$X_{i,c} = X \oplus C$$

(9)

is computed.

For values of $\epsilon \neq 0$, the following extra transformation is performed on $X_{i,c}$.

- If $\epsilon = 1$, then let $t = \text{blen} + \text{ilen} + \text{clen}$. The rightmost $t$ bits $X_{i,c}$ are represented as a finite field $\mathbb{F}_{2^t}$, using polynomial basis representation with the least lexicographically irreducible polynomial. If this element is non-zero, then its inverse is computed and its bit string representation replaces the rightmost $t$ bits of $X_{i,c}$. Note that $\epsilon = 1$ is not recommended as part of the ECOH submission, though it may be considered for inclusion in SHA-3 as an extra safety margin for making certain attacks appear harder.

- If $\epsilon = 2$, then $X_{i,c}$ is transformed as follows. As few bits as possible are discarded from the left, so that the result has a length that is a multiple of 64 bits. Then AES key wrap is applied, using the AES-128 with key of all zero bits. As few bits as possible are discarded from the left so that the length equals $m$. This is the transformed value of $X_{i,c}$. Note
that $\epsilon = 2$ is not suggested as part of the ECOH submission, though it may be considered for an inclusion in SHA-3 as a safety margin for making certain attacks appear harder and for making certain heuristic security arguments more plausible [2].

- If $\epsilon = 3$, then $X_{i,c}$ is transformed as follows. It is fed into another SHA-3 submitted hash function. The resulting $n$ bits then replace the rightmost $n$ bits of the $X_{i,c}$. Note that $\epsilon = 3$ is not suggested as part of the ECOH submission, though it may be considered for inclusion in SHA-3 as an extra safety margin that appears to make certain attacks harder, and for making an algorithm that more closely resembles MuHASH [1].

Next $X_{i,c}$ is converted to finite field element $x_{i,c}$. Mathematically,

$$x_{i,c} = \rho^{-1}(X_{i,c}),$$

where $\rho$ is the generalized parameters which is function from the field elements to bit strings. This element $x_{i,c}$ is called a candidate x-value.

The candidate x-value $x_{i,c}$ is tested as follows. If there exists a field element $y$ such that $(x_{i,c}, y)$ is an element of the group $\langle G \rangle$, then $x_{i,c}$ is valid. Otherwise $x_{i,c}$ is invalid.

This loop runs until a valid $x_{i,c}$ is found. The resulting may be denoted as $x_i$. The final value of the counter may be indicate as $c_i$. Note the $c_i$ is the smallest non-negative integer such that $x_{i,c}$ is valid.

### 5.2.7 Recovering

There will generally be two possible values of $y$ that correspond to a valid $x_i$. One of these will be chosen according to the criterion below, and will be indicated as $y_i$.

The chosen y-coordinate will be determined by the one which satisfies the following properties. When the field element $y_i/x_i$ is represented as a bit string of length $m$, its rightmost bit equals the leftmost bit of $N_i$.

The point $(x_i, y_i)$ will be indicated as $P_i$ and may be referred to as a term point.

### 5.2.8 Summing

The point

$$Q = \sum_{i=0}^{k} P_i = P_0 + \cdots + P_k$$

is computed. Note that the summation here is in the elliptic curve group, not addition in the finite field or ring of integers. The point $Q$ may be referred as the prehash or total point.

### 5.2.9 Converting

The x-coordinate $x(R)$ of elliptic curve point $Q$ is converted to a bit string $U = \rho(x(R))$. Some of the bits of $U$, as indicated by the parameters, are dropped, obtaining a bit string $V$. Then $V$ is converted to an integer $v$.

Note the recommended parameters indicate that the rightmost bit of $U$ is dropped. In this case, if the x-coordinate of $U$ when represented as a bit string represents the integer $u$, then $v = \lfloor u/2 \rfloor$.

The integer $v$ may be referred to as the multiplier.
5.2.10 Multiplying

The point \( S = vG \) is computed. Note that this is elliptic curve scalar multiplication; that is, \( v \) copies of \( G \) summed using elliptic curve operations.

This point may be referred to as the total scaled point.

5.2.11 Shifting

The point \( R = S + \beta Q \) is computed. Note that \( \beta \in \{0, 1\} \), so \( R \in \{S, S + Q\} \). This point may be referred to as the shifted total.

If \( \alpha = 1 \), then the x-coordinate of \( R \) and the x-coordinate of \( Q \) are converted to integers and added modulo \( 2^m \). The resulting integer is encoded into a bit string of length \( m \). This is encoded into a field finite element. The result field element replaces the x-coordinate of the point \( R \). The y-coordinate of \( R \) is not changed, and is not used in the ensuring calculation. Note that \( R \), once modified in this way, is a point, but it is very unlikely to be on the elliptic curve in question.

5.2.12 Converting

The same point-to-integer conversion process applied to \( Q \) is applied to \( R \). This is conversion is restated explicitly below, with new variable names.

The x-coordinate \( x(R) \) of \( R \) is converted to a bit string \( W = \rho(x(R)) \). Some of the bits of \( W \), as indicated by the parameters, are dropped, obtaining a bit string \( Z \). Then \( Z \) is converted to an integer \( h \).

Note the recommended parameters indicate that the rightmost bit of \( Z \) is dropped. In this case, if the x-coordinate \( R \), when represented as a bit string, also represents the integer \( r \), then \( h = \lfloor r/2 \rfloor \).

The integer \( h \) may be referred to as the integral hash.

5.2.13 Selecting

The integral hash \( h \) is represented as a bit string \( F \). Some subset, as indicated by the parameters of the algorithm, of the bits of \( F \) are selected for inclusion in a bit string \( H \) of length \( n \).

Note that, for the recommended parameters, the \( n \) rightmost bits of the bit string representation of \( h \) are used to form \( H \).

5.2.14 Output

The bit string \( H \) of length \( n \) is the output of the ECOH hash function.

5.3 Suggested alternative values of parameters

5.3.1 Curves for deterministic runtime

From certain implementation perspectives, the searching step of generalized ECOH is undesirable in that its runtime is nondeterministic. This can be overcome by use of different elliptic curves and binary fields, as follows.

- Use a binary field \( \mathbb{F}_{2^m} \), where \( m = 2p \) for some prime \( p \). Note that \( \mathbb{F}_{2^p} \) is a subfield of \( \mathbb{F}_{2^m} \).
• Use an elliptic curve with equation $y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b$ such that $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^p}$. Note that since the coefficients of the curve equation, the curve may be called a subfield curve.

• Use an encoding of $\rho : \mathbb{F}_{2^m} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ such that elements of $\mathbb{F}_{2^p}$ are mapped to bit strings whose leftmost $p$ bits are zeros. (A tower of polynomial basis representation may be used to achieve this.)

• Choose parameters $blen, ilen, clen$ such that $mlen + ilen + clen \leq p$.

In this case, it can be shown any candidate x-coordinate will be such that $x_{i,c} \in \mathbb{F}_{2^p}$ (not just in $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$). Each element in $\mathbb{F}_{2^p}$ will be the x-coordinate of a point on the curve with y-coordinate in $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$. Therefore, the only remaining condition on $x_{i,c}$ is that it also belong subgroup generated by $G$.

There exist efficient algorithms to test if a point on the curve is also in the subgroup generated by $G$, using only the x-coordinate of that point.

Also, it can be shown that for about half of all field elements in $\mathbb{F}_{2^p}$ the resulting y-coordinate will also be in $\mathbb{F}_{2^p}$. In the other half of x-coordinates in $\mathbb{F}_{2^p}$, it is possible to transform the point on the curve to the twist of the curve with both coordinates in $\mathbb{F}_{2^p}$. In both cases, it is possible to work entirely over the field $\mathbb{F}_{2^p}$ rather than $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$, at least until the final total point needs to be calculated.

Satoh and others have developed very efficient point counting algorithms for binary curves. Therefore it is possible to fix some $a$, say $a = 0$, and then choose random $b \in \mathbb{F}_{2^p}$, until one obtains a curve and its twist, whose orders are twice a prime and four times another prime, respectively, or vice versa. This would be ideal for making ECOH run in less variable time.

A major disadvantage of this alternative is that the NIST recommended curves would not be used.

5.3.2 Inverted ECOH

Generalized ECOH with parameter value $\epsilon = 1$ seems to thwart the most plausible collision finding attack on ECOH: solving Semaev summation polynomials.

5.4 Incremental mode of operation

If one has already computed the ECOH hash $H$ of a message $M$, and then a small change is made to the message, such as the re-assignment of a few bits, to obtain another message $M'$, it is possible to accelerate the computation of the ECOH hash $H'$ of message $M'$ by using some of the intermediate computation in the computation of the hash of $H$.

More precisely, let $M'$ and $M$ have bit lengths $mlen'$ and $mlen$, respectively, and let $\Delta = M' \oplus M$, where whichever of $M$ or $M'$ is shorter is extended by padding with zero bits on the right. If $\Delta$ is sufficiently sparser than $M'$, then given $M'$ and $\Delta$, and certain intermediate values in computation of $M$, it is possible to compute $H'$ more quickly than computing $H'$ directly from $M'$.

The intermediate values to allow acceleration computation of $M$, are $mlen$, $Q$ and $N_k$ (before obfuscation). The bit strings $\Delta$ and $N_k$ can be used to compute the revised checksum $N_k'$ before obfuscation, by parsing $\Delta$ into appropriately sized blocks, and xoring all of these into $N_k$. The revised total point $Q'$ can also be computed by subtracting off any old contributions from $M$.

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that differ from those of $M'$ (which may be located using $\Delta$) and then adding the corresponding contributions of $M'$.

Note that ECOH, in this mode of operation, like MuHASH, is incremental only the sense of in-place changes. In particular, insertions and deletions are not supported.

Insertions and deletions could be handled by using a different data structure, such as a linked list or tree. Specifying such data structure is beyond the scope of the ECOH specification. Nevertheless, because of the importance of insertion and deletion some discussion of this is provided.

Suppose that the actual content is a bit string. Before hashing the content undergoes two conversions. The first is conversion to a more flexible data structure, such as a linked list. The second is a conversion back to a bit string. Note that the resulting bit string would generally be considerably longer than the original content bit string, because it encodes the overhead information in the data structure used, such as the link pointer addresses in the link list records. This longer bit string is fed into the ECOH algorithm.

When an insertion occurs in the original bit string content, the linked list may be updated by the creation of new records, and changing a few link pointer addresses. When this revised linked list is encoded as a bit string, the link changes are in-place changes, while the new records may be added to the tail of the old the bit string. This therefore allows accelerated computation of the revised ECOH hash.

When a deletion occurs in the original bit string content, the linked list may generally be updated by the changing of a few pointer addresses, and by dropping a few records, and perhaps creation of a few new records. When this revised linked list is encoded as a bit string, the link changes are in-place changes, and the creation of new records, can be done by appending them to the end of the bit string. The dropped records may have been encoded somewhere in the middle of the bit string. These records are not pointed in the revised message, so they may be left there, effectively ignored. Again all changes are in-place so computing the ECOH hash of the revised bit string can be accelerated.

With this approach, after many insertions and deletions, garbage records will collect, and the records will be place out of sequence.
6 Security

This section describes the security of ECOH. For the sake of concreteness, the scope is limited to the assessment of various plausible attack strategies. For a more theoretical analysis involving reductionist security arguments, sometimes known as proofs of security, see §A.

The focus will be on the submitted version of ECOH, with only limited attention paid to generalized ECOH.

6.1 Collision Resistance

A collision in hash function $H$ is a pair of messages $(M, M')$ such that $M \neq M'$ and $H(M) = H(M')$. Any hash function with a larger domain than range must have a collision. In theory, there exists an efficient algorithm, namely one that outputs $M$ and $M'$ directly to find a collision. In practice, we do not know how to find this algorithm. To speak of collision resistance, therefore, means to measure the efficiency of all known algorithms that can find collisions. This section lists some collision finding algorithms.

6.1.1 Birthday Attack

The birthday collision finding algorithm is as follows. Fix some finite message space, such as all bit strings of length $4n$. Choose a random message from the message space. Compute its hash. Repeat until two of the hashes computed are identical. Note that the birthday collision finding algorithm is defined for any hash function.

Consider the heuristic assumption that, when the inputs are uniformly distributed in the message space the hash function’s outputs are nearly uniformly randomly distributed in the hash output range. For message spaces sufficiently large and independent of the hash function’s definition, such as all bit strings of a given length larger than $n$, then this heuristic seems reasonable if the output of the hash function appears pseudorandom.

Under this heuristic, the birthday collision finding algorithm is expected to find a collision after computing about $2^{n/2}$ hash values.

The heuristic can fail for certain message spaces. If the message space is too small, then the outputs may not be uniformly distributed. For example, if the message space is all bit strings of length $n/3$, then there can at most be $2^{n/3}$ outputs, and therefore most outputs will not occur. In this case, the birthday collision finding algorithm will fail. The heuristic can also fail for large message spaces if they are dependent on the hash function. For example, if the message space is defined to be all message whose hash is the all zeros bit string. With this type of failure of the heuristic, the birthday collision finding algorithm finds collision faster. However, such message spaces, although they exist, may not be amenable to efficient sampling of random elements. The heuristic can also fail if the hash function is not sufficiently pseudorandom.

Regardless, it seems reasonable that the birthday collision finding algorithm will find collision at a cost of about $2^{n/2}$ hash evaluations or fewer provided the message space used is sufficiently larger than $2^n$ and that the message space can be sampled efficiently. The birthday collision finding algorithm is the benchmark by which other collision finding algorithms are compared.
6.1.2 Semaev Summation Polynomial Attack

This collision finding attack strategy attempts to find a collision in the x-coordinate of the total point (prehash) \( Q \), using Semaev’s summation polynomials [10], which are now reviewed.

Let \( \mathbb{F} \) be a finite field. Let \( E \) be an elliptic curve with Weierstrass equation having coefficients in \( \mathbb{F} \). Let \( \mathcal{O} \) denote the point of infinity, which is the identity (neutral) element of the elliptic curve group. Semaev proved that there exists a multivariable polynomial \( f_n = f_n(X_1, \ldots, X_n) \) with the following property. For any \( x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_n \in \mathbb{F} \), there exists \( y_1, \ldots, y_n \) such that

\[
(x_1, y_1) + \cdots + (x_n, y_n) = \mathcal{O}
\]  

(12)

if and only if

\[
f_n(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = 0.
\]  

(13)

Furthermore, the polynomial \( f_n \) has degree \( 2^{n-2} \) in each variable \( X_i \). (Its total degree may be less than \( n2^{n-2} \).)

To use summation polynomials to attack ECOH, we try to find \( M \) and \( M' \) such that \( Q = Q' \), where \( Q' \) indicates the prehash obtained in computing the ECOH hash of \( M' \). More generally, for any intermediate values that one might get in the computation of the ECOH hash of \( M \) and write with symbol \( s \), we write \( s' \) for the corresponding symbol in the computation of \( M' \).

A \( Q = \pm Q' \) collision means that

\[
P_0 + \cdots + P_k \pm ((-P'_0) + \cdots + (-P'_{k'})) = \mathcal{O}
\]  

(14)

According Semaev’s result, this implies that

\[
f_{k+k'}(x_0, \ldots, x_k, x'_0, \ldots, x'_{k'}) = 0,
\]  

(15)

because, a point \(-P\) and \( P \) have the same x-coordinate.

Note that (14) and (15) are not equivalent. Indeed, Semaev’s result only states that if (15) is true then at least one of the \( 2^{k+k'} \) possible choices of possible y-coordinates \((y_0, \ldots, y_k, y'_0, \ldots, y'_{k'})\) gives (14).

An attack strategy is to find \( M \) and \( M' \) such that (15) holds. A reasonable heuristic is the y-coordinates used by ECOH will vary randomly and independently of the y-coordinates needed in (14). In other words, once equation (15) is satisfied, then we have probability of about \( 2^{-(k+k')} \) of getting the desired collision in \( Q + Q' \).

This may seem to require that \( k + k' \) be made low. However, in fact, the adversary may have a better variant of this strategy, where a low index summation polynomial may be used for longer messages. The adversary can fix certain blocks of \( M \) and \( M' \), and only allow a few to vary, say \( v \) in total. For example, the adversary could fix \( M' \) entirely, and fix all but the first two blocks of \( M \). Furthermore, the adversary could vary \( N_0 \) and \( N_1 \) such that \( N_0 \oplus N_1 \) is some constant value, which means that the checksum point \( P_k \) is fixed too. Then (14) may be re-written as

\[
P_0 + P_1 + F = \mathcal{O}
\]  

(16)

where \( F \) is some fixed point, and \( P_0 \) and \( P_1 \) are unknowns. Using summation polynomials this implies

\[
f_3(x_0, x_1, x) = 0
\]  

(17)

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where $x$ is the x-coordinate of the fixed point $F$. A solution to (17) should have at least a 12.5% chance of giving a solution to (16) and thereby a collision in ECOH. The equation (17) has degree two in each of the variables $x_0$ an $x_1$, and since $x$ is constant, we may re-write the equation as

$$g(x_0, x_1) = 0$$

(18)

where now the fixed value $x$ is incorporated into the definition of $g$.

At this point, we may observe that by definition of ECOH, $x_i = a_i + n_i z$ where $a_i$, $z$ and $n_i$ are field elements of low degree (in the polynomial basis representation, which we now assume). Furthermore, $n_i$ is derived directly from the message, and $z$ is fixed value, used to shift the message bits to the left inside the x-coordinate. The value $a_i$ includes the index and the counter. We can expect the counter value to be quite low, so the adversary can make reasonable guesses at $b_i$ using low values. Therefore, the adversary can try to solve (18) by solving the following equation

$$h(n_0, n_1) = 0$$

(19)

where $n_0$ and $n_1$ are now low degree field elements, and the polynomial $h$ is derived from $g$ by incorporation of the fixed values $z$ and the guessed values for $b_0$ and $b_1$.

But recall that $N_0 \oplus N_1$ was fixed in this version of the attack. Consequently, $n_1$ may be expressed in terms of $n_0$, the constants $N_0 \oplus N_1$ and $z$, and the guesses $b_0$ and $b_1$. Therefore, we get a single equation

$$q(n_0) = 0$$

(20)

This equation will be quartic. It will have, therefore, at most four roots. Making a heuristic assumption that the four roots are random field elements, then the probability that they sufficiently low degree to serve as $n_0$ is negligible.

The attacker may choose to get around this by varying more of the message, say $n_0$ and $n_1$ and $n_2$. In this case, a two variable polynomial is obtained, and the adversary’s task is to find low degree solutions. Such solutions may exist. Semaev notes [10] that finding low degree solutions to multivariate polynomials allows one to find discrete logarithms in elliptic curves more quickly. This suggests that finding low degree roots is difficult, even they exist, because the elliptic curve discrete logarithm has appeared to remain difficult despite [10]. Since discrete logs are expect to take $2^{m/2}$ steps to solve, finding low degree solutions to the multivariate polynomials deduced from Semaev summation polynomials, as described above, may also take $2^{m/2}$ steps. Therefore, this attack seems no better than the birthday attack.

That said, the low degrees in [10] may be considerably lower than those needed against ECOH. Further research may be needed to asses the difficulty of these problems.

In the event that this attack is discovered to require less work than $2^{m/2}$ bit operations, such as if finding sufficiently low degree solutions to polynomials above can be done this efficiently, then this deficiency may be resolved by amending ECOH to make it more like MuHASH. This could be done by setting $\epsilon \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ in the generalized ECOH algorithm. In this case, the attack described above does not work because a transformation is applied mixing the message bits and the index bits and the counter bits, so that the resulting x-coordinate cannot so readily be expressed as a predetermined polynomial of a unknown but low degree finite field element. Specifically, a polynomial equation as in (19) cannot be directly derived from (18).
6.1.3 Shifted collision attacks

The recommended parameter $\beta = 1$ is intended to provide preimage resistance. Unlike the alternative parameters $\beta = 0$ choice, it introduces the possibility that $Q \neq \pm Q$ but $R = \pm R'$. This would mean that

$$Q \pm Q' = (v' \pm v)G,$$

where $v$ and $v'$ are, recall, obtained from the x-coordinates of $Q$ and $Q'$. Ignoring for the moment how one obtains $M$ and $M'$ corresponding to $Q$ and $Q'$, one attack strategy is to find $Q$ and $Q'$ satisfying (21).

One strategy to solve (21) is to pick random $Q$ and $Q'$ and to see if the desired equation holds. On the heuristic the discrete logs and x-coordinate are essentially random and independent of one another, then each guess would have probability of about $2^{-m}$ of success. The attack would therefore take $2^m$ steps, which is much slower than the birthday attack.

6.1.4 Truncation attack

An attacker may try to find a collision in which $R \neq \pm R'$, but $H = H'$. Such pairs $(R, R')$ certainly exist, are easy to find. Given such a pair, one has to find the corresponding message $(M, M')$. One can easily pick one of the messages first and then find the other with exhaustive search, at cost of about $2^m$ steps. Again this is much worse than the birthday attack.

6.2 Second Preimage Resistance

Second preimage resistance is defined relative to some message space with a given probability distribution. A message $M$ is selected from this message space according to the given probability distribution. The adversary then must find a second message $M'$ such that $M' \neq M$ with the same hash value, that is, $H(M) = H(M')$. Note that it is not required that $M'$ belongs to the same message space.

If the hash has second preimage resistance of $n$ bits, then finding this $M'$ should require work of about $2^n$ operations.

6.2.1 Exhaustive search for second preimages

In the exhaustive search algorithm, a message search space is fixed, not necessarily the same space as the one for $M$. The search space should be larger than $2^n$, such as the set of all bit strings of length $2n$. Then random messages $M'$ are selected from the search space until one has $H(M') = H(M)$.

Under the heuristic that the hashes of random messages from the search space are nearly uniformly distributed in the hash output space, this algorithm is expect to require about $2^{n-1}$ hash evaluations.

This heuristic is generally reasonable, unless the hash fails in some respect to be pseudorandom, and also the distribution for $M$ is such that the hash of $M$ is among the less likely values of hashes of the values in the search space. In this case, the algorithm above may require more than $2^{n-1}$ hash evaluations.
6.2.2 Wagner’s Generalized Birthday Attack

Wagner [12, Theorem 3] describes an application of his generalized birthday attack in which many discrete logarithms are solved in order to decompose a point into any group into a sum of points each from a given list. Essentially for \( t \geq 1 \), then this attack takes about

\[
2^{t+m\left(\frac{1}{2}+\frac{1}{1+t}\right)}
\]

elliptic curve group operations. Suppose that ECOH did not include the XOR checksum. Then, this attack could be used to find a second preimage of the weakened ECOH hash of some given message. This would be an internal collision in the sense that the intermediate \( Q \) values of the two message would be identical. Setting \( t = 2 \), this would be a 235, 340, or 475 bit attack for the curves B-283, B-409 and B-571. Therefore, if this attack could be launched, then it would be below NIST’s required threshold, specifically, by 13, 36 and 28 bits, respectively.

Wagner’s attack, however, does not include a method to handle any dependency between the blocks. In particular, the checksum in final the ECOH point contributing to \( Q \), would create an unusual dependency between the discrete logs of the points \( P_i \). Perhaps Wagner’s attack can be extended to handle relations from the checksum in the point representation space and in the discrete log space. This may have an associated cost.

6.2.3 Semaev summation polynomial second preimages

Solving Semaev summation polynomials can also be used to obtain second preimages, similarly to what was done with collisions.

6.3 Preimage Resistance

Preimage resistance of a hash function refers to difficulty of the problem of taking a random bit string \( H \) and finding a message \( M \) equals \( H \).

SHA-3 submissions are expected to have \( n \) bits of preimage resistance. This means that an algorithm that computes preimage with significant probability should take about \( 2^n \) operations. It would also be true if no preimage finding algorithm has probability of success more than about \( 2^{-n} \). More generally, if an algorithm requires \( t \) bit operations and has probability of success \( \epsilon \), then \( t/\epsilon \) should be approximately \( 2^n \).

An \( n \)-bit hash function with constant output has \( n \) bits of preimage resistance under this definition. Arguably this is counterintuitive, and a good reason to consider an alternative definition of preimage resistance, as in §6.4, for which the constant function is not preimage resistant. However, the security of certain digital signature schemes employing hash functions, such as ECDSA, require the definition above of preimage resistance. This is a strong reason not to abandon this definition, despite its trivial instantiation. In this light, the explanation for the counterintuitiveness of the constant function being preimage resistant is that our intuition says it is insecure mainly because it is not collision resistant, not because it is not preimage resistant. In other words, collision resistance and preimage resistance are somewhat independent notions.\(^2\)

We consider the following two preimage attacks on ECOH.

\(^2\)Indeed, take any collision resistant hash and construct from it another that remains collision resistant but fails to be preimage resistant. Therefore, these notions are effectively independent, in that neither implies the other.
6.3.1 Exhaustive preimage search

Given a bit string $H$ of length $n$, do the following to attempt to find a preimage. Fix a finite message space, such as all message some fixed length, such as $4n$. Choose a message $M$ uniformly at random in the message space and compute its hash. If the hash of $M$ equals $H$, then stop and output $M$ as the preimage. If the hash is not $H$, repeat until done.

Under the heuristic that the hashes of random messages uniformly distributed in the message space are nearly uniformly distributed bit strings of length $n$, then we can conclude the following. If $t$ is the time the algorithm is allowed to run, and $\epsilon$ is the probability that algorithm finds a preimage, then $t/\epsilon \approx 2^n$.

This is a generic algorithm to find preimages in a hash function. Its runtime complexity analysis depends on a heuristic of the randomness of the output of the hash. We conjecture that this heuristic is reasonable for ECOH.

More generally, a milder heuristic gives the same estimate of success. The milder heuristic is that message space is such that for $t$ random messages one expects approximately $t$ different outputs of the hash on these outputs.

6.3.2 Inverting ECOH

Another strategy is to find a preimage of the bit string $H$ of length $n$ is the following. The attack has two stages. The first stage is the following.

- For each bit string $B$ of length $m - n - 1$ do the following steps.
- Form the bit string $X' = B\| H$ of length $m - 1$.
- Append to $X'$ a single bit to obtain a bit string $X$ such that $X$ represents the x-coordinate of a point $\langle G \rangle$, if it exists.
- For each of two possible points $R$ with x-coordinate represents by $X$ do the following.
  - For each point $Q$ in $\langle G \rangle$ do the following.
  - Compute $R' = Q + \lfloor x(Q)/2 \rfloor G$. If $R' = R$, stop and output $Q$.

Then second stage is to find $M$ such that the ECOH computation on $M$ yields $Q$ as the intermediate total of elliptic curve points. This could be done by exhaustive search, or perhaps by using Semaev summation polynomials.

Regardless of the method used in the second stage, under the heuristic assumptions $R' = R$ with probability approximately $2^{-m}$, the first stage would be expected to take about $2^{m-n-1+m-1}$ iterations to find a collision. Because $m > n + 1$, the first stage takes more than $2^n$ operations.

6.4 Relative Preimage Resistance

As noted above, it may be worthwhile to consider another type of preimage resistance, which we will call relative preimage resistance and define below. It is defined relative to a known message space with a probability distribution. The adversary is given the hash of message selected at random from this message space according to the given probability distribution. The adversary must then find some message whose hash equals the hash of the unknown message.
Note that this definition is the same as second preimage resistance except that (a) the adversary is given the hash of first message rather than the first message, and (b) the adversary wins even if it finds the first message.

Under the heuristic that the hash function outputs are random, then there exists some easily sampled probability distribution of messages such that images of these messages give rise to every possible bit string in the range of the hash function with approximately equal probability. With respect to these general message spaces, the relative preimage resistance is equivalent to the preimage resistance.

Relative preimage resistance differs from standard preimage resistance primarily for specialized message spaces. Relative preimage resistance can be defined for small message spaces. If a message space has size $2^s$, then an adversary can find, by exhaustive search (see below) a preimage with work of about $2^s$ steps. Therefore, the bit of security defining relative preimage resistance are relative to the message space, and in particular, its size in bits.

### 6.4.1 Exhaustive search for preimages

Given a hash value, one can exhaustively search for random messages from the message space one takes on the desired hash value.

The adversary should guess the message is order of highest probability in the distribution, if able. With one guess the adversary has probability of success $2^{-h}$, where $h$ is the min-entropy of the probability distribution. For repeated guessing, the number of guesses needed to be quite certain to find a preimage depends on the probability distribution, and the way the hash produces collisions on that probability distribution. On the heuristic the hash outputs are random and independent of the inputs, then this attack should require about at most $2^n$ guesses and at least about $2^h$ guesses, especially if $h \ll n$.

### 6.4.2 Single block inversion

This is a specific attack one may try against ECOH. It is a relative preimage attack whose probability distribution has entropy $blen$ bits, which is less than $n$ bits. The aim of the attack of the attack is to be faster than exhaustive search, which one heuristically would expect to take $2^{blen}$ guesses.

In this attack all but one block is fixed and known to the adversary. Suppose that $N_j$ is the secret block. The adversary is given the hash $H$ and must determined the unknown message block. The adversary loops over all points $R$ in $(G)$ that truncate down to $H$. This loop has approximately $2^{m-n}$ steps.

If $\beta = 0$, then the attacker solves a discrete log to get $v$ and thus $Q$. This has cost of about $2^{m/2}$ elliptic curve group operations. If $\beta = 1$, then the attacker does an exhaustive search for $Q$, taking $2^m$ elliptic curve group operations. (I do not know of a $2^{m/2}$ step algorithm to solve this).

Then adversary knows all the term points except $P_j$ and $P_k$. These can be subtracted from $Q$ to obtain $P_j + P_k = (x, y)$. Suppose that $\omega = 0$, then $x_k = x_j + \delta$ for some $\delta \in \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ that the attacker knows, because of the way the tail indexed block is computed as checksum. So the attacker needs to solve for $x_j$ in the equation:

$$ (x_j, y_j) + (x_j + \delta, y_k) = (x, y) $$

(23)
The attacker does not know $y_j$ and $y_k$, but here perhaps Semaev summation polynomials will again be useful. The result is a single variable polynomial equation in $x_j$, which the adversary can easily solve over $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$.

Therefore for $\beta = 0$, the cost of the attack is approximately $2^{m-n+m/2}$, which is larger than exhaustive search $2^{\text{blen}}$ provide $(3/2)m > n + \text{blen}$. This is the case for the recommended parameters.

For $\beta = 1$, an extra margin of safety is provided.

For $\omega = 1$, then the checksum block is an obfuscated function of $x_j$, and the attack does not work. Solving for $x_j$ can be done by exhaustive search.

### 6.5 Pseudorandomness

The output of ECOH is a truncated elliptic curve point. An algorithm [5, 8] to distinguish ECOH output from random bit strings is as follows. Compute all possible values of the x-coordinate that could have been truncated to obtain the ECOH hash. Test each of these for validity of being a point on the elliptic curve. If the proportion of valid points is higher than half, then guess that it is an ECOH hash.

Therefore, the output of ECOH is distinguishable from a random bit string of the same length, with work proportional to the number of bits truncated, and a mild success rate. This attack can be iterated over many ECOH outputs to obtain a higher success rate.

In many cryptographic applications, such distinguishability is not known to lead to any attacks. Indeed, users of ECOH would not attempt to hide the fact that they are using ECOH. In this attack, the adversary mainly learns the user is using ECOH, information that is public already. Furthermore, there is evidence [3, Theorem 1] that using x-coordinates as elliptic curve private keys does not compromised security. In the principal submitter’s opinion, although this is technically a distinguishing attack, nothing practical can be gained from it.

Nonetheless, note that generalized ECOH provides an option $\alpha = 1$, which seems to thwart this attack. This option uses addition modulo $2^m$.

### 6.6 Side Channel Resistance

It seems intrinsic to the design of ECOH that any implementation must inevitably run in time that varies with the message being hashed. Specifically, a counter must be incremented until a point on the curve is found. This creates a potential for a side channel, which may be harmful if the message being hashed is a secret, especially a low-entropy secret.

As an implementation-level countermeasure, the implementation can introduces dummy operations to mask the message-dependent variability, or even attempt to make things run usually in the same amount of time, with the rarer exceptions masked by some other means. The blocks can also be processed in randomized order.

As a protocol-level countermeasure, one can try to avoid hashing secrets, or at least low-entropy secrets.

### 6.7 Denial of Service Resistance

The following strategy could be used as a denial of service attack against ECOH. An adversary could search for a message $M$ with one or more blocks requiring a high value of the counter $C_i$. Hashing the message will therefore take longer, because the hasher must search longer.
We now estimate the efficiency of this strategy. First note, that for submitted version of ECOH only odd values of the counter $c$ need be considered. For any given message block $O_i$, the probability the number $t$ of odd $c$ that must be tried is $2^{-t}$. Note $c = 2t - 1$. Furthermore, the attacker has no efficient way of finding messages with larger $t$. That is, the attacker must use trial and error, selecting random messages until one with high $t$ is found.

Under this heuristic, an attacker would have try about $2^t$ values of message block until is found requiring $t$ tries. In other words, the attacker must use exponentially more work to force the users to linearly more work. From this perspective, the attack is rather mild.
7 Applications

Currently, SHA-1 and SHA-2 have four main applications in NIST standards:

- computing message digests in digital signature schemes, e.g. ECDSA,
- message authentication, i.e. HMAC,
- key derivation for key agreement, e.g. Concatenation KDF,
- pseudorandom number generation, e.g. Hash-based DRBG.

The following sections discuss how to apply ECOH in the five cases, directly, and in some cases, in an alternative manner.

7.1 Digital Signatures

When using ECOH in a digital signature scheme, such as ECDSA, one can just take the output of ECOH and use it is the same manner as one would use SHA-2.

When using ECDSA with the same curve as used in ECOH, the elliptic curve implementation can be common to both algorithms, thereby providing a slightly smaller implementation.

7.2 Message Authentication

The HMAC construction was specifically intended for a hash function using Merkle-Damgard iteration, so using ECOH in HMAC would not be what HMAC was intended for. Nevertheless, we identified no attacks on using ECOH as the hash in the HMAC construction.

7.3 Pseudorandom Number Generation

If ECOH were used as part of the Hash DRBG to build a pseudorandom number generator, one would arrive at something similar in some respects to the Dual EC DRBG.

As noted earlier, an adversary willing to do some work can distinguish ECOH outputs from random bit strings. The same attacks applies to the Dual EC DRBG. We submit, however, that this is the only effective information that the adversary learns: whether the bit string is generated as an ECOH output or not. In most applications of pseudorandom number generators, this would not be an issue.

For the purposes of generating random numbers to be used as elliptic curve keys [3] provides some heuristic arguments that building private keys from x-coordinates of random points is not problematic.

7.4 Key Derivation

A key derivation function (KDF) is subject to most of the concerns of a pseudorandom number generator, as outlined in §7.3.

The output of a key derivation function is sometimes used as key stream. For example, ECIES has this as an option. Suppose that ECIES is implemented with this option, and with ECOH serving the role of the hash function inside a KDF construction. If an adversary knows that the
plaintext has one of two candidate values, then given an ECIES ciphertext, the adversary can subtract the plaintext to get two candidate key streams. This streams can be tested for consistency with being produced by ECOH. Likely, one will be consistent and the other not, with the consistent key stream coming from the plaintext that was encrypted. Note the ECIES is not included as a NIST standard.

7.5 Randomized Hashing

We identified no issues with using random hashing that are specific to ECOH.
References


A Heuristic Security Arguments

In this section, heuristic arguments for the security of ECOH are given.

A.1 Collision Resistance

Wagner [12] defined the \(k\)-sum problem. In the context of elliptic curve groups, this problem may be expressed as follows.

**Problem A.1.** Given a point \(Y\) and \(k\) lists of random points \(L_1, \ldots, L_k\), find \(P_i \in L_i\) such that \(Y = P_1 + \cdots + P_k\).

Wagner [12] proves a theorem, attributed to Dai, that if the \(k\)-sum problem can be solved in time \(t\), then the discrete logarithm problem can be solved in time almost \(t\).

Now consider a collision \((M, M')\) in ECOH, where the associated intermediate values are related \(Q' = \pm Q\). We call such a collision an internal collision. Then

\[
P_0 + P_1 + \cdots + P_k \mp (P'_0 + P'_1 + \cdots + P'_k) = \mathcal{O}
\]

The problem of finding an internal ECOH problem is similar to the \((k + k' + 2)\)-sum problem, with the exception that the lists \(L_1\) involved are not necessarily of random points but of points whose \(x\)-coordinates have a particular structure.

If one adopts the loose heuristic that the structure in \(x\)-coordinate amounts to effectively a random list of points, then finding an internal ECOH collision may be viewed as an instance of the \(k\)-sum problem. Under this heuristic, it is at least as hard as the discrete log problem, because of Wagner and Dai’s theorem.

If an ECOH collision is not an internal collision, then it must be an external collision.

A.2 Second Preimage Resistance

A second preimage gives also collision, so we get at least the same amount of security as provided by collision resistance.

A.3 Preimage Resistance

The shifted scalar multiply function in ECOH takes a point \(Q\), maps its \(x\)-coordinate to an integer \(v\) and returns the point \(R = Q + vG\). We generalize this slightly. Let \(E\) be the elliptic curve group in question. A function \(f : E \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}\) is called a conversion function. We will be mostly interested in the conversion function used by ECOH which maps \(Q\) to \(v\) above. Given a conversion function \(f\), we can define function \(\phi : E \times E \rightarrow E\) by

\[
\phi(S, Q) = Q + f(Q)S.
\]

We will also write this as \(\phi_S(Q)\). This function is the generalized shifted scalar multiply. We formulate the following problem.

**Problem A.2.** Given \(S\) and \(\phi_S(Q)\), find \(Q\).

We call this problem the shifted log problem. We conjecture as follows.

**Conjecture A.1.** If the conversion function \(f\) is almost injective, then solving the shifted log problem cost about \(N\), the order of \(G\), group elliptic curve group operations.
Compared to the discrete log problem, which takes about $\sqrt{N}$ operations to solve, this problem is conjecturally much harder.

An immediate objection to this conjecture is that the shifted log problem may in fact be easier than the discrete log problem, requiring much fewer than $\sqrt{N}$ group operations. We observe, however, than an algorithm to solve the shifted log problem could be used to forge an ECDSA signature.

**Theorem A.1.** Let $f$ be the conversion function used in ECDSA to determine the $r$ component of the signature from an elliptic curve point. Let $A$ be an algorithm that solves the associated shifted log problem where $f$. Then an algorithm $F$ can be built that calls $A$ once can be used to forge an ECDSA signature. The forger is as efficient as $A$ plus a very small extra cost.

**Proof.** Algorithm $F$ is given message $M$ and public key $P$ with respect to which to forge a signature. Algorithm $F$ has access to a subroutine $A$ such that $A(T, S)$ inverts $\phi_S$ on $T$. In other words, $A$ is such that

$$T = A(T, S) + f(A(T, S))S. \hspace{1cm} (26)$$

We now describe algorithm $F$.

Algorithm $F$ computes $e = H(M)$ where $H$ is the hash used in ECDSA, including the step of conversion to an integer. Recall that a pair of integers $(r, s)$ is a valid signature for message $M$ and public key $P$ if and only if:

$$r = f((e/s)G + (r/s)P) \hspace{1cm} (27)$$

where the divisions above are done modulo $N$. Observing that (27) holds if

$$R = (e/s)G + (f(R)/s)P \hspace{1cm} (28)$$

and $r = f(R)$, the following strategy can be used for $F$.

First $F$ chooses random $s$ and computes $S = -(1/s)P$ and $T = (e/s)G$. Then $F$ calls $A$ to compute

$$r = f(A(T, S)), \hspace{1cm} (29)$$

and output $(r, s)$ as an ECDSA signature. To see that this a valid signature, write $R = A(T, S)$. By (26),

$$(e/s)G = R - (f(R)/s)P, \hspace{1cm} (30)$$

which clearly implies (28). \hfill \Box$

Therefore, the shifted log problem associated with the ECDSA conversion function is at least as hard as being able to forge an ECDSA signature on any message given only the public key.

Assuming the security of ECDSA, this only assures that shifted log problem is about as hard as $\sqrt{N}$ elliptic curve group operations.

We give a heuristic argument in the generic group model suggesting that the shifted log problem takes about $N$ group operations, not just $\sqrt{N}$ group operations. We assume that $f$ is almost bijective.

**Theorem A.2.** An algorithm $A$ working in the generic group that finds a point that is the shifted log of the first two independent points, that makes $q$ queries has a probability of success of approximately $q/N$. 

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Proof. The desired result is \( T = R + f(R)S \), where \( T \) and \( S \) are first two independent points in the generic group session.

If \( R \) is also independent in the session, with public representation chosen by \( A \), then its private value will be randomly by the generic group oracle, and the probability of the desired is exactly \( 1/N \), the probability that \( R = T - f(R)S \) holds in the private space.

If \( R \) is a dependent point in the generic group session, then its private value is determined by the generic group oracle before its public representation is chosen by the generic group oracle. Because \( f \) is almost invertible, and the representation of \( R \) is chosen uniformly at random, the distribution of \( f(R) \) is almost uniformly at random. The probability of the desired result is therefore only a little more than \( 1/N \), depending on the degree of departure of \( f \) from being bijective.

Now suppose that adversary \( B \) could find preimages in ECOH. Then \( B \) can be used to solve the shifted log problem, with a somewhat lowered probability of success, as follows. Build an algorithm \( A \) to solve the shifted log problem by calling \( B \) as subroutine. First \( A \) truncates its input and gives to \( B \). When \( B \) returns its preimage \( M \), we have a heuristic argument that there is some probability that the final point obtained in the computation of the hash of \( M \) before truncation is the same as the point for which \( A \) is trying to solve the shifted log. For example, in ECOH-256, this probability is \( 2^{-27} \). In this case, the value of \( Q \) in the computation of the ECOH hash of \( M \) is the desired shifted log.

A.4 Pseudorandomness

As noted earlier, ECOH outputs are slightly distinguishable from random bit strings. Heuristic arguments suggest, however, that otherwise ECOH outputs are not generally distinguishable. For example, in the generic group model of an elliptic curve, the points map randomly into a space. In this case points in the space may be slightly distinguishable from random bit strings.
B  Examples

In this section, some examples of ECOH are given.

B.1  Some Examples

Tables 10–13 give the output of ECOH on six different bit strings. The output is given in hexadecimal notation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M</th>
<th>( H(M) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>C86A6DBA2030177D298A1104EF3D5754666B3DDF306F94E6BE96CFA4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1D6F757C15908D5F6695C8AB2940CBF8F707F2B42BF9E0BF832761F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001100</td>
<td>D704100A2F928565CAD79E427618E84EE63C902F4D1B36ED2634D0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11001100</td>
<td>60102BBF4D997BE46C754A6367C0FAD8C552076DCE0212891D0C792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100110000</td>
<td>9BC7F964121BF2B70DB8CC66C90C0659665F4978AD15EBBB40A680D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 10: ECOH-224 examples**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M</th>
<th>( H(M) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>AC160817C86A6DBA2030177D298A1104EF3D5754666B3DDF306F94E6BE96CFA4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>33E772D61D6F757C15908D5FF669C58AB2940CBF8F707F2B42BF9E0BF832761F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001100</td>
<td>5A297E85D704100A2F928565CAD79E42761B3E84EE63C902F4D1B36ED2634D0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11001100</td>
<td>7D1EEF786012BBF4D997BE46C754A6367C0FAD8C552076DCE0212891D0C792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100110000</td>
<td>FE46B2829BC7964121BF2B70DB8CC66C90C0659665F4978AD15EBBB40A680D</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 11: ECOH-256 examples**

B.2  Examples of Intermediate Values

B.2.1  ECOH224 Example (one-block Message)

Let the message \( M \) be the 120-bit ASCII string “abcdefgijkmno” which is equivalent to the hexadecimal string:

\[
6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F
\]

The message is padded by appending a one bit followed by 7 zero bits, resulting in the 128-bit value \( N \), which in hexadecimal is:

\[
6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F80
\]

We can parse \( N \) into one 128-bit blocks, \( N_0 \) in hexadecimal format

\[
N_0 = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F80
\]
### Table 12: ECOH-384 examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$M$</th>
<th>$H(M)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>E1B847F4AE0E878BD8A9D07063267515E7FECF1CD8C4E2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1C8649E9D96A7764D0BB37F1EE3B601129E71B0368FE96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>48318BB401E92273F3F3215680D995B0A1DA89E4F7619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C2FFDA3F68BFDF1795871B7E683437903757F229E4B2D9D5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001100</td>
<td>594FC0E4F3803359172BDE3C2148F96ACCD4EE7AA416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11001100</td>
<td>386B7DD30F11DD5084FD0ECC0E585C24E0EE89D34DF4D06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100110000</td>
<td>EAA441ABD14DB54049D2A43AB7F33CBD7C0EC57664D6F8A9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2D4DBAD96842EE2570E84C14213CC00998A97426C695493</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 13: ECOH-512 examples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$M$</th>
<th>$H(M)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>B366D9054215EE6418B5E48B633B85B34C0CE8E7316CE8C6E1CD941C47E3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>555357293701864470F8B4F1BD69D6A0484D748363965B18441E4EE2AE01CDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>D2636EF1FFF6E51431AE962E16D1355314F08FDA1BC3392CE59846A6A3457D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B0D635F921163BD5A8E089B6941B12DA242554DF74F904A975FD15CE2220C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001100</td>
<td>946F6B1DD63364864CBAC497BC1ACF4BF6E87C36A1AD0F043110D90066178BDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11001100</td>
<td>3E305821E741E4CE19DF34A1EA2D5BEF8B8D4E9A8C95586C055EA51B02D7BA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100110000</td>
<td>6D5445FF7137D57F38601DDE02A4F5D5763CCC4E73371993B439072A37BF0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AA49C5734BE376C335A97AF36DFC6C38E665F0DB112534B63B3D4C6FB6A6DDEEC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

§B EXAMPLES
Next, $O_0$ is formed by appending the 64-bit counter values for 0, to $N_0$ to get $O_0$, in hexadecimal as

$$O_0 = 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 \ 0000000000000000$$

We form $O_1 = (\bigoplus N_i) \| I_{\text{mlen}}$, where $\text{mlen}$ is the 64-bit representation of the bit length of M, so that $I_{\text{mlen}} = 0000000000000078$. In totality we get $O_1$ in hexadecimal format

$$O_1 = 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 \ 0000000000000000078$$

For $O_0$ we start with a counter value $c_0 = 1$ in hexadecimal format

$$0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000$$

This when combined with $0^{27} \| O_0 \| 0^{64} \oplus C_0$ gives us $X'_0$, in hexadecimal format

$$X'_0 = 0000000000000000 \ 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 \ 000000000000000001$$

which decompresses to a point on the curve secp283r1 when $C_0 = 3$, or when $X_0$ in hexadecimal format is

$$X_0 = 0000000000000000 \ 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 \ 000000000000000003$$

This decompresses using the OctetString-to-ECPoint conversion routine in [11], where $y_p = \text{leftmost bit of } N_0$, $y_p = 0$ gives us the point $P_0$

$$P_0 = (0000000000000000 \ 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 \ 000000000000000003, \ 000000000050376A6 \ A334368C305B46E0 \ 802EF2781CFCC550 \ D12E2983032F745D \ 25EA3D8A50D2F7BD)$$

Which is added to $Q$, initialized as the point at infinity to become,

$$Q_0 = (0000000000000000 \ 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 \ 000000000000000003, \ 000000000050376A6 \ A334368C305B46E0 \ 802EF2781CFCC550 \ D12E2983032F745D \ 25EA3D8A50D2F7BD).$$

Now with $O_1$ we construct $X'_1 = 0^{27} \| O_1 \| 0^{64} \oplus C_1$, where $C_1$ starts = 1

$$X_1 = 0000000000000000 \ 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 \ 0000000000000000078 \ 0000000000000001$$

which decompresses using the OctetString-to-ECPoint conversion routine in [11], where $y_p = \text{leftmost bit of } N_1$, $y_p = 0$, gives us the point $P_1$

$$P_1 = (0000000000000000 \ 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 \ 00000000000000078 \ 0000000000000001, \ 0000000002B39C01 \ 5A3546A831E3A973 \ 230EA15EA17C472B \ 09A7207588C53B68 \ 023A68A6A22C9262)$$

§B EXAMPLES 40
Which is added to $Q$ to become,

$$Q_1 = (0000000001493FB2 \text{ CA26C851E35B29AA 085E61DD2E8C93B3 2040B7430A102D71 B5C50CB6682A5063 , 000000001587CE 606D9A9EE15712A9 E2244AB827B92294 4E7D3D310FAEFCA3 4B1B5A681D39EA4D }) .$$

We can interpret the $x$-coordinate as an multi-precision integer and divide by two taking the floor of the result, or simply dropping the remainder to get the following in hexadecimal format

$$\left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1)}{2} \right\rfloor = 0000000000A49FD9 65136428F1AD94D5 042F30EE974649D9 90205BA1850816B8 DAE2865B34152831 .$$

Using this value as an integer we can multiply the base point of the curve to get,

$$\left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1)}{2} \right\rfloor G = (00000000038372D3 05CF94C4D2B2D1AB A4D9A1FA975F149F 982C013BF866C92 9054333FF2E6D9F , 000000005501C6A DA6DE07D2B0A2C7 0316D973D90CC645 F63AB923DF8EC6A6 53E048D1513BA111 ) .$$

Adding that value back with $Q_1$ above we get,

$$Q_1 + \left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1)}{2} \right\rfloor G = (0000000005157E42 95D6FF0C5B3D9D00 FA1B0D76A04ADBF9 0252C748B2C46850 BDCF32AFBF9C5AAB , 0000000002A28F1B 83177FAC4824222D 412B691FA51524DF 126D535AFF08BB73 9A9F304A236397AF ) .$$

And again interpreting the $x$-coordinate of the result as a multiprecision integer and dividing by 2 discarding the remainder to get

$$\left\lfloor \frac{x(Q + \left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1)}{2} \right\rfloor G)}{2} \right\rfloor = 00000000028ABF21 4AEB7F862D9ECE80 7D0D86BB50256DFC 812963A459623428 5EE79957DFCE2D55 .$$

From this result the rightmost 224-bits are extracted to get the message digest.

$$H = 2D9ECE807D0D86BB50256DFC812963A4596234285EE79957DFCE2D55 .$$

### B.2.2 ECOH224 Example (two-block Message)

Let the message $M$ be the 248-bit ASCII string “abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcde” which is equivalent to the hexadecimal string:

$$6162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a6162636465 .$$

The message is padded by appending a one bit followed by 7 zero bits, resulting in the 256-bit value $N$, in hexadecimal string:

$$§B \text{ EXAMPLES} 41 .$$
\[ N_0 = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F70 \]

\[ N_1 = 7172737475767778797A616263646580 \]

\( O_0 \) is formed by prepending the 64-bit counter values for 0, \( 0000000000000000 \) to \( N_0 \) to get \( O_0 \) in hexadecimal format

\[ O_0 = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F70 \]

\( O_0 \) in hexadecimal format

\[ O_0 = 6162636465666768 \]

\( O_1 \) is formed by prepending the 64-bit counter values for 1, \( 0000000000000001 \) to \( N_1 \) to get \( O_1 \) in hexadecimal format

\[ O_1 = 7172737475767778797A616263646580 \]

\( O_1 \) in hexadecimal format

We form \( O_2 = (\bigoplus N_i) || \text{mlen}, \) where \( \text{mlen} \) is the 64-bit representation of the bit length of \( M \), \( I_{\text{mlen}} = 0000000000000000 \) F8. In totality we get \( O_2 \) in hexadecimal format

\[ 1010101010101010 \]

This when combined with \( 0^{27} || O_0 || 0^{64} \oplus C_0 \) gives us \( X'_0 \), in hexadecimal format

\[ X'_0 = 0000000000000000 \]

which decompresses to a point on the curve sect283r1 when \( C_0 = 7 \), or when \( X_0 \) in hexadecimal format is

\[ X_0 = 0000000000000000 \]

This decompresses using the OctetString-to-ECPoint conversion routine in [11], where \( y_p = \) leftmost bit of \( N_0 \), \( y_p = 0 \) gives us the point \( P_0 \)

\[ P_0 = (0000000000000000 \]

which is added to \( Q \), initialized as the point at infinity to become,

\[ Q_0 = (0000000000000000 \]

Now with \( O_1 \) we construct \( X'_1 = 0^{27} || O_1 || 0^{64} \oplus C_1 \), where \( C_1 \) starts = 1

\[ X'_1 = 0000000000000000 \]

§B EXAMPLES 42
which decompresses directly to a point on the curve sect283r1 $P_1$

$P_1 = (0000000000000000 7172737475767778 797A6162636465680 0000000000000001 0000000000000001, 000000003554E1E E469855991ACD3A7 684E71E8DE83B716 153E2A4D9F7555E7 5C26B1C1DDD4F660)$

Which is added to $Q$ to become,

$Q_1 = (0000000002519C79 ABB30532C0277212 FA7527B2EF45BEAE CC90C6569765D7CC 004E63CF26E51764, 0000000034745F9 D4060AFE61B0D246 6A42DBFE67DD9160 12D17A335769B05B 49974C557F48FF18)$

We can now construct the final block $X' = 0^{|O_j|} \oplus C_2$ with $C_2 = 1$, gives us $X'$, in hexadecimal format

$X' = 0000000000000000 10101010101010 1010000000000000F8 0000000000000003$

Which decompresses with $C_2 = 3$ to give us the point $P_2$,

$P_2 = (0000000000000000 10101010101010 1010000000000000F8 0000000000000003, 0000000005101D6 63A2FC2E0F1806E7 999BC9FAE01D787A 943C2574136D9E 2D0913E239F15AE)$

We can interpret the x-coordinate as an multi-precision integer and divide by two taking the floor of the result, or simply dropping the remainder to get the following in hexadecimal format

$\lfloor x(Q_2)/2 \rfloor = 000000000103FEE6 3050362889E3ECBA 76E7B462BA3036ED$

$7008B18D94AC856C 47A4610A8204AD88$

Using this value as an integer we can multiply the base point of the curve to get,

$\lfloor x(Q_2)/2 \rfloor G = (0000000002703FE2 871E5F59C4E80175 8A7C3F5964B213E3$

$D111BCFC280B33DB 7FE445CB1C699729, 000000000D12956 76446E7693FC0C4BFC6A94206F3C34$

$BC4305D537C1A8CC 4B2636C2D5D6C8D4)$

Adding that value back with $Q_2$ above we get.
ECOH B.2 Examples of Intermediate Values

\[ Q_2 + \lfloor x(Q_2)/2 \rfloor G = (00000000060883AD E578F697250191F3 0EB2F4094732BB66 7D7D90AEB0C6AB30 EC9AC49D96EB54C8, 00000000100886D 599FEB046E1F1968 2446D3D2870CB271 2B6C4432B0D42044 3F6CDA67C42F2E2D) \]

And again interpreting the x-coordinate of the result as a multiprecision integer and dividing by 2 discarding the remainder to get

\[ \lfloor x(Q_2 + \lfloor x(Q_2)/2 \rfloor G)/2 \rfloor = (00000000030441D6 F2BC7B4B9280C8F9 87597A04A3995DB3 3EBEC85758635598 764D624ECB75AA64) \]

From this result the rightmost 224-bits are extracted to get the message digest.

\[ H = 9280C8F987597A04A3995DB33EBEC85758635598764D624ECB75AA64 \]

B.2.3 ECOH256 Example (one-block Message)

Let the message M be the 120-bit ASCII string “abcdefghijkmno” which is equivalent to the hexadecimal string:

\[ 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F \]

The message is padded by appending a one bit followed by 7 zero bits, resulting in the 128-bit value N, the hexadecimal string:

\[ 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F80 \]

We can parse N into one 128-bit blocks, \( N_0 \) in hexadecimal format

\[ N_0 = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F80 \]

\( O_0 \) is formed by prepending the 64-bit counter values for 0, 0000000000000000 to \( N_0 \) to get \( O_0 \) in hexadecimal format

\[ O_0 = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F80 0000000000000000 \]

We form \( O_1 = (\bigoplus N_i) \parallel I_{mlen} \), where \( mlen \) is the 64-bit representation of the bit length of M, \( I_{mlen} = 0000000000000000 \). In totality we get \( O_1 \) in hexadecimal format

\[ O_1 = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F80 00000000000000078 \]

For \( O_0 \) we start with a counter value \( C_0 = 1 \) in hexadecimal format

\[ 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 \]

This when combined with \( 0^{27} \parallel O_0 \parallel 0^{64} \oplus C_0 \) gives us \( X'_0 \), in hexadecimal format

§B EXAMPLES 44
$X_0' = \text{0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 0000000000000000 0000000000000001}$

which decompresses to a point on the curve sect283r1 when $C_0 = 3$, or when $X_0$ in hexadecimal format is

$X_0 = \text{0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 0000000000000000 0000000000000003}$

This decompresses using the OctetString-to-ECPoint conversion routine in [11], where $y_p = \text{leftmost bit of } N_0$, $y_p = 0$ gives us the point $P_0$

$$P_0 = (\text{0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 0000000000000000 0000000000000003},$$

$$\text{00000000050376A6 A334368C305B46E0 802EF2781CFCC550 D12E983032F745D 25EA3D8A50D2F7BD}).$$

Which is added to $Q$, initialized as the point at infinity to become,

$$Q_0 = (\text{0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 0000000000000000 0000000000000003},$$

$$\text{00000000050376A6 A334368C305B46E0 802EF2781CFCC550 D12E983032F745D 25EA3D8A50D2F7BD}).$$

Now with $O_1$ we construct $X_1' = 0^{27} || O_1 || 0^{64} \oplus C_1$, where $C_1$ starts = 1

$$X_1 = \text{0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 00000000000000078 0000000000000001}$$

which decompresses using the OctetString-to-ECPoint conversion routine in [11], where $y_p = \text{leftmost bit of } N_1$, $y_p = 0$, gives us the point $P_1$

$$P_1 = (\text{0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F80 00000000000000078 0000000000000001},$$

$$\text{000000002B39C01 5A3546A831E3A973 230EA15EA17C472B 09A7207588C53B68 023A68A6A22C9262}).$$

Which is added to $Q$ to become,

$$Q_1 = (\text{00000000001493FB2 CA26C851E35B29AA 085E61DD2E8C93B3 2040B7430A102D71 B5C50CB6682A5063},$$

$$\text{0000000001587CE 606D9A9EE15712A9 E2244AB827B92294 4E7D3D310FAEFCA3 4B15A681D39EA4D}).$$
We can interpret the x-coordinate as an multi-precision integer and divide by two taking the floor of the result, or simply dropping the remainder to get the following in hexadecimal format

\[
\left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1)}{2} \right\rfloor = 0000000000A49FD9 65136428F1AD94D5 042F30EE974649D9 90205BA1850816B8 DAE2865B34152831
\]

Using this value as an integer we can multiply the base point of the curve to get,

\[
\left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1)}{2} \right\rfloor G = (00000000038372D3 05CF94C4D2E2B1AB A4D9A1FA975F149F 982C013BF86C4692 905433FFD2ED6EF3, 0000000005501C6A DA6D0E07D2B0A2C7 0316D973D90CC645 F63AB923DFBEC6A6 53E048D1513BA111).
\]

Adding that value back with \( Q_1 \) above we get,

\[
Q_1 + \left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1)}{2} \right\rfloor G = (0000000005157E42 95D6FF0C5B3D9D00 FA1B0D76A04ADBF9 0252C748B2C46850 BDCF32AFBF9C5AAB, 0000000002A28F1B 83177FAC4824222D 412B691FA51524DF 126D535AFF08BB73 9A9F304A236397AF).
\]

And again interpreting the x-coordinate of the result as a multi-precision integer and dividing by 2 discarding the remainder to get

\[
\left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1 + \left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1)}{2} \right\rfloor G)}{2} \right\rfloor = 00000000028ABF21 4AEB7F862D9ECE80 7D0D86BB50256DFC 812963A459623428 5EE79957DFCE2D55.
\]

From this result the rightmost 256-bits are extracted to get the message

\[
H = 4AEB7F862D9ECE807D0D86BB50256DFC812963A4596234285EE79957DFCE2D55
\]

**B.2.4 ECOH256 Example (two-block Message)**

Let the message \( M \) be the 248-bit ASCII string “abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcde” which is equivalent to the hexadecimal string:

\[
6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A6162636465
\]

The message is padded by appending a one bit followed by 7 zero bits, resulting in the 256-bit value \( N \), in hexadecimal string:

\[
N_0 = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F70
\]

\[
N_1 = 7172737475767778797A616263646580
\]
$O_0$ is formed by prepending the 64-bit counter values for 0, $0000000000000000$, to $N_0$ to get $O_0$ in hexadecimal format

$$O_0 = 6162636465666768\ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70\ 0000000000000000$$

$O_1$ is formed by prepending the 64-bit counter values for 1, $0000000000000001$, to $N_1$ to get $O_1$ in hexadecimal format

$$O_1 = 7172737475767778\ 797A616263646580\ 0000000000000001$$

We form $O_2 = (\bigoplus N_i)||I_{mlen}$, where $mlen$ is the 64-bit representation of the bit length of $M$, $I_{mlen} = 0000000000000000F8$. In totality we get $O_2$ in hexadecimal format

$$O_2 = 10101010101010\ 10100A0E0A0AF0\ 00000000000000F8$$

Now we can build $X_0$ by constructing $0^{27}||O_0||0^{64} \oplus C_0$ gives us $X'_0$, in hexadecimal format

$$X'_0 = 0000000000000000\ 6162636465666768\ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000001$$

which decompresses to a point on the curve sect283r1 when $C_0 = 7$, or when $X_0$ in hexadecimal format is

$$X_0 = 0000000000000000\ 6162636465666768\ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000007$$

This decompresses using the OctetString-to-ECPoint conversion routine in §11, where $y_p =$ leftmost bit of $N_0$, $y_p = 0$ gives us the point $P_0$

$$P_0 = (0000000000000000\ 6162636465666768\ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000007,\ 0000000005D2D2B2\ 6B08807376F86FC0\ 31616229DACDD074\ EDDD97B55E07F882\ 753192E074303C35)$$

Which is added to $Q$, initialized as the point at infinity to become,

$$Q_0 = (0000000000000000\ 6162636465666768\ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000007,\ 0000000005D2D2B2\ 6B08807376F86FC0\ 31616229DACDD074\ EDDD97B55E07F882\ 753192E074303C35)$$

Now with $O_1$ we construct $X'_1 = 0^{27}||O_1||0^{64} \oplus C_1$, where $C_1$ starts = 1

$$X_1 = 0000000000000000\ 7172737475767778\ 797A616263646580\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000001$$

which decompresses directly to a point on the curve sect283r1 $P_1$

$$P_1 = (0000000000000000\ 7172737475767778\ 797A616263646580\ 0000000000000000\ 0000000000000001,\ 0000000003554E1B\ E469855991ACD3A7\ 684E71E8DE83B716\ 153E2A4D9F7555E7\ 5C26B1C1DDD4F660)$$
Which is added to Q to become,

\[ Q_1 = (000000002519C79 ABB30532C0277212 FA7527B2EF45B3A3 \text{ CC90C6569765D7CC} 004E63CF26E51764, \]

\[ 0000000034745F9 D4060A6F1002D247 6A42DBFE6FD9160 \text{ 12D17A335769B05B} 49974C557F4F18 \)  

We can now construct the final block \( X'_2 = 0^{27}||O_2||0^{64} \oplus C_2 \) with \( C_2 = 1 \), gives us \( X'_2 \), in hexadecimal format

\[ X'_2 = 0000000000000000 10101010101010 10100A0E0E0A0AF0 00000000000000F8 0000000000000001 \]

Which decompresses with \( C_2 = 3 \) to give us the point \( P_2 \),

\[ P_2 = (00000000207FDCC 60A06C5113C7D974 \text{ EDCF68C574606DDA} \text{ E011631B29590AD8} 8F48C21504095B10, \]

\[ 000000005101D6 63A2FC2E0F1806E7 999BC9FAE01D787A 943C2574136DAC9E 2D0913E2E39F15AE \)  

We can interpret the x-coordinate as a multi-precision integer and divide by two taking the floor of the result, or simply dropping the remainder to get the following in hexadecimal format

\[ \left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_2)}{2} \right\rfloor = 0000000000103FEE6 305036288E3ECBA 76E7B462BA3036ED \]

\[ 7008B18D94AC856C 47A4610A8204AD88 \]

Using this value as an integer we can multiply the base point of the curve to get,

\[ \left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_2)}{2} \right\rfloor G = (0000000002703FE2 871E5F59C480175 8A7C3F5964B213E3 \]

\[ D111BCFC280B33DB 7FE445CB1C699729, \]

\[ 0000000000D12956 76446E7693FFC04C BFCA6A94206F3C4 \]

\[ BC4305D537C1A8CC 4B2636C2D6C8D4 \)  

Adding that value back with \( Q_2 \) above we get.

\[ Q_2 + \left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_2)}{2} \right\rfloor G = (000000000060883AD E578F697250191F3 0EB2F4094732BB66 \]

\[ 7D7D90AE0C6AB30 \text{ EC9AC49D96EB54C8}, \]

\[ 00000000100886D 599FEB04E1F1968 2446D3D2870CB271 \]

\[ 2B6C4432B0D42044 3F6CDA67C42F2E2D \)  

And again interpreting the x-coordinate of the result as a multi-precision integer and dividing by 2 discarding the remainder to get
\[ |x(Q + [x(Q_2)/2]G)/2| = 00000000030441D6 F2BC7B4B9280C8F9 87597A04A3995DB3 3EBEC85758635598 764D624ECB75AA64 \]

From this result the rightmost 256-bits are extracted to get the message digest.

\[ H = F2BC7B4B9280C8F987597A04A3995DB33EBEC85758635598764D624ECB75AA64 \]

**B.2.5 ECOH384 Example (one-block Message)**

Let the message \( M \) be the 184-bit ASCII string “abcdefgijkmnopqrstuvwxyz” which is equivalent to the hexadecimal string:

\[ M = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F7071727374757677 \]

The message is padded by appending a one bit followed by 7 zero bits, resulting in the 192-bit value \( N \), the hexadecimal string:

\[ N_0 = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767780 \]

\( O_0 \) is formed by prepending the 64-bit counter values for 0, 0000000000000000 to \( N_0 \) to get \( O_0 \) in hexadecimal format

\[ O_0 = 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 7172737475767780 0000000000000000 \]

We form \( O_1 = (\oplus N_i)\|I_{mlen} \) where \( mlen \) is the 64-bit representation of the bit length of \( M \), \( I_{mlen} = 0000000000000000B8 \). In totality we get \( O_1 \) in hexadecimal format

\[ O_1 = 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 7172737475767780 0000000000000000B8 \]

For \( O_0 \) we start with a counter value \( C_0 = 1 \) in hexadecimal format

\[ C_0 = 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000001 \]

This when combined with \( 0^{89}\|O_0\|0^{64} \oplus C_0 \) gives us \( X'_0 \), in hexadecimal format

\[ X'_0 = 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 7172737475767780 000000000000000000000000000000000001, \]

which decompresses to a point on the curve sect409r1 when \( C_0 = 3 \), or when \( X_0 \) in hexadecimal format is
\[ X_0 = \text{0000000000000000 0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70} \]
\[ 71727374757677780 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 \]
This decompresses using the OctetString-to-ECPPoint conversion routine in [11], where \( y_p = \) leftmost bit of \( N_0 \), \( y_p = 0 \) gives us the point \( P_0 \)

\[ P_0 = (\text{0000000000000000 0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70} \]
\[ 71727374757677780 0000000000000000 000000000000000003 , \]
\[ 0000000000191A0B06ADAB93E784A6F23C8C5CB5034646DEB231E882BADD533D18 \]
\[ 352E7A772DC80390 \text{DE7F091C4BB9E0CC} 1BC8AC79BD3D7641 ) \]

Which is added to \( Q \), initialized as the point at infinity to become,

\[ Q_0 = (\text{0000000000000000 0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70} \]
\[ 71727374757677780 0000000000000000 000000000000000003 , \]
\[ 0000000000191A0B06ADAB93E784A6F23C8C5CB5034646DEB231E882BADD533D18 \]
\[ 352E7A772DC80390 \text{DE7F091C4BB9E0CC} 1BC8AC79BD3D7641 ) \]

Now with \( O_1 \) we construct \( X'_1 = 0^{89} \| O_1 \| 0^{64} \oplus C_1 \), where \( C_1 \) starts = 1

\[ X'_1 = \text{0000000000000000 0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70} \]
\[ 71727374757677780 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 \]

which decompresses using the OctetString-to-ECPPoint conversion routine in [11], where \( y_p = \) leftmost bit of \( N_1 \), \( y_p = 0 \), when \( C_1 = 17 \), this gives us the point \( P_1 \)

\[ P_1 = (\text{0000000000000000 0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70} \]
\[ 71727374757677780 0000000000000000B8 00000000000000011 , \]
\[ 000000000011B9198B0E8A54681342F4B42C836D91BB2FB7A4436B25671A3296E \]
\[ 3F76AE9B9CF67022 \text{F916732B72AC3BDC} 713BD501017E25E7 ) \]

Which is added to \( Q \) to become,

\[ Q_1 = (\text{00000000001AE7127CA01E4D745CA9624 F82AFC5D6A3B11DD 0CA8F7CB68894F4F} \]
\[ B8D638FF9E664193BF48AE768F30073EC08BC6C6A1A0DC3 , \]
\[ 0000000000A814E0A50090F86016B37ECE25C8423D416C89C94BF40BED02C22 \]
\[ CE28CC4B506B2F3D1608EDE68DDE731A3BA86C87ACAC2FC1 ) \]

We can interpret the x-coordinate as an multi-precision integer and divide by two taking the floor of the result, or simply dropping the remainder to get the following in hexadecimal format.
ECOH B.2 Examples of Intermediate Values

\[ |x(Q_1)/2| = 0000000000D73893 \ E500F26BA2E54B12 \ 7C157E2EB51D88EE \ 86547BE5B444A7A7 \ DC6B1C2FFCF3320C \ 9DFA4573B4798039 \ F6045E36350D06E1 \]

Using this value as an integer we can multiply the base point of the curve to get,

\[ |x(Q_1)/2|G = (0000000001B78FC0 \ 9C0E1CC13B6CC64F \ EFE4BAB16991E533 \ 4FFC78BEAB7FCA19 \ 368B43A487E1F183 \ C2BBBE0170113636 \ 0CF226E944F177A7, \ 0000000001485DE6 \ C2D7CD42A23D3C2C \ 0F2708227101A9BD \ 4FE06F4CC63C9F73 \ 9E650AB49E022983 \ B9933045FCF47928 \ B6EFF44E4B4C1199) \]

Adding that value back with \( Q_1 \) above we get.

\[ Q_1 + |x(Q_1)/2|G = (00000000004542EB \ 2CA38A8BCBD25140 \ 5E57ED9918D5FE8 \ D63EE9578E9F6BA4 \ 5BF7CBE94A8C9622 \ 8A8A45E961A70AA8 \ 9FB050B5AE3E8C25, \ 00000000015C8F57 \ A6DFD85FD32359FD \ 10ABE69DA053A179 \ EA12ACB77D1C3AFE \ 5E6AEEAF085DA460 \ B7417E72C018185C \ 1A1A9A8642AD16B0) \]

And again interpreting the x-coordinate of the result as a multi-precision integer and dividing by 2 discarding the remainder to get

\[ |x(Q + |x(Q_1)/2|G)/2| = 000000000022A175 \ 9651C545E5928A0 \ 2F2BF44C8C6AA7F4 \ 6B1F74ABC74FB5D2 \ 2DFBE5F4A5464B11 \ 454522F4B038554 \ 4FD8285AD71F4612 \]

From this result the rightmost 384-bits are extracted to get the message

\[ H = 9651C545E5928A02F2BF44C8C6AA7F46B1F74ABC74FB5D2 \ 2DFBE5F4A5464B11454522F4B0385544FD8285AD71F4612 \]

B.2.6 ECOH384 Example (two-block Message)

Let the message \( M \) be the 376-bit ASCII string “abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz” which is equivalent to the hexadecimal string:

\[ M = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767777 \ 8797A6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767777 \]

The message is padded by appending a one bit followed by 7 zero bits, resulting in the 128-bit value \( N \), the hexadecimal string:

\[ N_0 = 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 \ 7172737475767778 \]
$N_1 \text{797A616263646566 6768696A6B6C6D6E 6F70717273747580}$

$O_0$ is formed by prepending the 64-bit counter values for 0, 0000000000000000 to $N_0$ to get $O_0$ in hexadecimal format

\[ O_0 = \text{6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 7172737475767778 0000000000000000} \]

$O_1$ is formed by prepending the 64-bit counter values for 1, 0000000000000001 to $N_1$ to get $O_1$ in hexadecimal format

\[ O_1 = \text{797A616263646566 6768696A6B6C6D6E 6F70717273747580 0000000000000001} \]

We form $O_2 = (\bigoplus N_i) \| I_{\text{mlen}}$, where $mlen$ is the 64-bit representation of the bit length of $M$, $I_{\text{mlen}} = 00000000000000178$. In totality we get $O_2$ in hexadecimal format

\[ O_2 = \text{181802060602020E 0E0202060202F8 0000000000000178} \]

Now we can build $X_0$ by constructing $0^{89} \| O_0 \| 0^{64} \oplus C_0$, starting with $C_0 = 1$, gives us $X'_0$, in hexadecimal format

\[ X'_0 = \text{0000000000000000 0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 7172737475767778 0000000000000000 0000000000000005} \]

which decompresses to a point on the curve sect409r1 when $C_0 = 5$ using the OctetString-to-ECPoint conversion routine in [11], where $y_p$ = leftmost bit of $N_0$, $y_p = 0$ gives us the point $P_0$

\[ P_0 = \text{0000000000000000 0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 7172737475767778 0000000000000000 0000000000000005 , 0000000002A9D4 633A89ED45FC23E9 6476C50243F01639 CB31E3755862468D 3665E103B45D4318 37C9221F30DF8347 2A19D141C426D5F6 } \]

Which is added to $Q$, initialized as the point at infinity to become,

\[ Q_0 = \text{0000000000000000 0000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 7172737475767778 0000000000000000 0000000000000005 , 00000000002A9D4 633A89ED45FC23E9 6476C50243F01639 CB31E3755862468D 3665E103B45D4318 37C9221F30DF8347 2A19D141C426D5F6 } \]
Now with $O_1$ we construct $X'_1 = 0^{89} || O_1 || 0^{64} \oplus C_1$, where $C_1$ starts = 1

\[
X_1 = 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 797A616263646566 6768696A6B6C6D6E \\
6F70717273747580 0000000000000001 0000000000000001
\]

Which decompresses directly to a point on the curve sect409r1 $P_1$

\[
P_1 = (0000000000000000 0000000000000000 797A616263646566 6768696A6B6C6D6E \\
6F70717273747580 0000000000000001 , 00000000017ABC5 8579B719E59AB9A 1924229BF48A2D52 F0C99A23E5B1679 \\
D4D146A98DE6CA55 0474671158DA55F5 678B24D385FD7D6 )
\]

Which is added to $Q$ to become,

\[
Q_1 = (000000000129965A 444E38624E57FEAF D0B8E7FD0E2B4BE BD95E05CE5E628B4 \\
47F2A31B93D7BE2A E028E2238772B39B C1CFF55E90133459 , 000000001031F49 EE41BFAFBBF99A6B 406A00AF92EBDE91 B214017BBD707715 \\
CA68AF201F47B129 92EF935A9D630BDD D7140567E370AD0B )
\]

We can now construct the final block $X'_2 = 0^{89} || O_2 || 0^{64} \oplus C_2$ with $C_2 = 1$, gives us $X'_2$, in hexadecimal format

\[
X'_2 = 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 181802060602020E 0E0202060602021E \\
1E020206060202F8 0000000000000178 0000000000000001
\]

Which decompresses when $C_2 = 3$ to the point $P_2$,

\[
P_2 = (0000000000000000 0000000000000000 181802060602020E 0E0202060602021E \\
1E020206060202F8 00000000000000178 000000000000000003 , 000000000099B9CC 7CE297AE658E24B DA59D3A01E537877 FBCEFA70EB5707DB \\
3101CED05D713B61 341C6BFCC72130AA 57EC7CC71D1781AA )
\]

Which is added to $Q$ to become,

\[
Q_2 = (00000000008A53C3 3C34D0CD168EDCBB 05B2C39C996B4021 37D726FBBCC16B08 \\
04891FA81733FEBAC 9D8244BFE15FDD4 027ADD037EF366E5 , 00000000001EEAF69 56ACF64D091381E7 06BC51323CF613F9 C9E84B88343F4C4A \\
8A4D1B7CD4F3AFEB 19349155A9345A16 F2EB64A4F6F11F37 )
\]

We can interpret the x-coordinate as an multi-precision integer and divide by two taking the floor of the result, or simply dropping the remainder to get the following in hexadecimal format
| x(Q2)/2 | = 00000000004529E1 9E1A68668B476E5D 82D961CE4CB5A010 9BE8937FDE68B584 02448FD4D99FFF5E 4Ec1225FF0AEEEA 013D6ED1BF79B372

Using this value as an integer we can multiply the base point of the curve to get,

|x(Q2)/2|G| = (0000000000DC6524 44632FA528E947A2 0E5D0FB8FF7E0C1B 842337D61EABD6A6 2C435902317EF84 FF02FC1B4D4957A0 EF4A96F197D3DCF7 , 0000000000C04329 FB7FA27CE5C60AFF 9F976998EF12B41 310EBEBFC10231C9 E9E04524694CBBB1 27DF3B511DD2C5B 6FB3EEDB90B0BCE2 )

Adding that value back with Q2 above we get.

Q2 + |x(Q2)/2|G| = (0000000001C758E8 0547F77A76A9B832 9FBBAD13C66C0843 7234301ACD1DE3F8 140CFAD7B732CD42 36B9A51578E871E1 2FF5441CD65730B , 0000000000C2EF8E 49265185371E1213 B21A1039ED8E6D83 328F012E0176610 195F86F6974D01D3F 42A5C67020860282 C3D7FDE36C4FF82 )

And again interpreting the x-coordinate of the result as a multi-precision integer and dividing by 2 discarding the remainder to get

|x(Q + |x(Q2)/2|G|)/2| = 0000000000E3AC74 02A3FBBD3B54DC19 4FDDD689E3360421 B91A180D668EF1FC 0A067D6BDB9966A1 1B5CD28ABC7438F0 97FAA20E6BB2B985

From this result the rightmost 384-bits are extracted to get the message

H = 02A3FBBD3B54DC194FDDD689E3360421B91A180D668EF1FC 0A067D6BDB9966A11B5CD28ABC7438F097FAA20E6BB2B985

B.2.7 ECOH512 Example (one-block Message)

Let the message M be the 248-bit ASCII string “abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcde” which is equivalent to the hexadecimal string:

M = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A6162636465

The message is padded by appending a one bit followed by 7 zero bits, resulting in the 256-bit value N, the hexadecimal string:

N0 = 6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A616263646580
$O_0$ is formed by prepending the 128-bit counter values for 0, 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 to $N_0$ to get $O_0$ in hexadecimal format

$$O_0 = \begin{array}{c} 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 \ 7172737475767778 \ 797A616263646580 \\
0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \\
\end{array}$$

We form $O_1 = (\bigoplus N_i) \| I_{mlen}$, where $mlen$ is the 64-bit representation of the bit length of $M$, $I_{mlen} = 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 F8$. In totality we get $O_1$ in hexadecimal format

$$O_1 = \begin{array}{c} 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 \ 7172737475767778 \ 797A616263646580 \\
0000000000000000 \ 00000000000000F8 \end{array}$$

For $O_0$ we start with a counter value $C_0 = 1$ in hexadecimal format

$$C_0 = \begin{array}{c} 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000001 \end{array}$$

This when combined with $0^{59} || O_0 || 0^{128} \oplus C_0$ gives us $X'_0$, in hexadecimal format

$$X'_0 = \begin{array}{c} 0000000000000000 \ 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 \ 7172737475767778 \ 797A616263646580 \\
0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \\
\end{array}$$

which decompresses when $C_0 = 9$ giving the first point on the curve $sect571r1$, $P_0$

$$P_0 = \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} 0000000000000000 \ 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 \ 7172737475767778 \ 797A616263646580 \\
0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000001 \end{array} \\
041B4ABA9CB08A2F F43895E48F2F7E6C 44AF5AA4FA946FBB AF17273DCABCACEE E5B44857D9FEA5F5 D7F2D8F508257492 0B3D1678050BB9F4 279EF306EDF6D802 DB31BACE8B9E1BF8 \end{array}$$

Which is added to $Q$, initialized as the point at infinity to become,

$$Q_0 = \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} 0000000000000000 \ 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 \ 7172737475767778 \ 797A616263646580 \\
0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000009 \end{array} \\
041B4ABA9CB08A2F F43895E48F2F7E6C 44AF5AA4FA946FBB AF17273DCABCACEE E5B44857D9FEA5F5 D7F2D8F508257492 0B3D1678050BB9F4 279EF306EDF6D802 DB31BACE8B9E1BF8 \end{array}$$

Now we form $X'_1 = 0^{59} || O_1 || 0^{128} \oplus C_1$, starting with $C_1 = 1$ as an integer to get

$$X'_1 = \begin{array}{c} 0000000000000000 \ 6162636465666768 \ 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 \ 7172737475767778 \ 797A616263646580 \\
0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000000 \ 0000000000000001 \end{array}$$
which decompresses directly to a point on the curve sect571r1

$$P_1 = (00000000000000000 6162636465666768 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 7172737475767778 797A616263646566 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001, 04F740D739C396A0DEA35193BFA3BE0F2A46DFCA56B0816F44047BCDE11E988FD012355EA07828B 90F659F7994F5DA2 59BA39AD49DAF7E9 8182E605BB194C70 A6AACCAD71073F00)$$

Which is added to Q to become,

$$Q_1 = (0747F927845CBFF2DB3250B42CE6E164B2E18A90038C6B6D 04F740D739C396A0DEA35193BFA3BE0F2A46DFCA56B0816F44047BCDE11E988FD012355EA07828B 90F659F7994F5DA2 59BA39AD49DAF7E9 8182E605BB194C70 A6AACCAD71073F00)$$

We can interpret the x-coordinate as a multi-precision integer and divide by two taking the floor of the result, or simply dropping the remainder to get the following in hexadecimal format

$$\left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1)}{2} \right\rfloor = (03A3FC93C22E5FD96D99285A167370B2 5970C54801C635B6E5A17FFCAC55BA30F211EF464F6BC229 0DACDA18E29B164293753B2CC7E593C50635B231D4B440DF4FE3C987E9831CE)$$

Using this value as an integer we can multiply the base point of the curve to get,

$$\left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1)}{2} \right\rfloor G = (060860C6EC61FA098D9EAC0A03A878C16C780A513ED3F8B1DF65621ADE1E4E4B 04F740D739C396A0DEA35193BFA3BE0F2A46DFCA56B0816F44047BCDE11E988FD012355EA07828B 90F659F7994F5DA2 59BA39AD49DAF7E9 8182E605BB194C70 A6AACCAD71073F00)$$

Adding this result back into the value of Q1 above we get

$$Q_1 + \left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_1)}{2} \right\rfloor G = (07FD7954FDFACFCC2B2AB2EDA39C2647C9F6EF37BD2C0CB89B39EA19F305304F3656404C17C23A9E6D3834370CE6FCFB926B77ACE984DED7ED35C8F53666FB2A0730C47902C5A, 059D22A547B3E3FC0B5BBEB41658B6A3FC20C0AA8C5B52050AEB15DB65D0E26FB20C040FFFA3FFF3530CBFD184BD89C1A596CD87C9CA82AC264832821C5E0E3B203BCF1E0D8099B)$$
And again interpreting the x-coordinate of the result as a multi-precision integer and dividing by 2 discarding the remainder to get

\[ x(Q + x(Q_1)/2)/2 = 03FEBCAA7EF0D7E6 15D5976D1CE1323E 7CB779BDE96065C4 D9CF50CF98298279B 2A2B20260BE171D4 F369C1A21B86737E 7DC935BB674C26F 6BF69AE47A9B337D 9553C1E023C8162D \]

From this result the rightmost 512-bits are extracted to get the message

\[ H = 15D5976D1CE1323E7CB779BDE96065C4D9CF50CF98298279B2A2B20260BE171D4F369C1A21B86737E7DC935BB674C26F6BF69AE47A9B337D9553C1E023C8162D \]

### B.2.8 ECOH512 Example (two-block Message)

Let the message M be the 504-bit ASCII string “abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmnopqrwxyzabcdefghijk” which is equivalent to the hexadecimal string:

\[ M = \text{6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A616263646566} \]

The message is padded by appending a one bit followed by 7 zero bits, resulting in the 128-bit value N, the hexadecimal string:

\[ N_0 = \text{6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A616263646566} \]

\[ N_1 = \text{6768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A6162636465666768696A6B} \]

\[ O_0 \text{ is formed by prepending the 128-bit counter values for } 0, \text{0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000} \text{ to } N_0 \text{ to get } O_0 \text{ in hexadecimal format} \]

\[ O_0 = \text{6162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A616263646566} \]

\[ O_1 \text{ is formed by prepending the 128-bit counter values for } 1, \text{0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001} \text{ to } N_1 \text{ to get } O_1 \text{ in hexadecimal format} \]

\[ O_1 = \text{6768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A6162636465666768696A6B} \]

We form \( O_2 = (\bigoplus N_i)\|I_{\text{mlen}} \), where \( \text{mlen} \) is the 64-bit representation of the bit length of M, \( I_{\text{mlen}} = \text{00000000000000178} \). In totality we get \( O_2 \) in hexadecimal format
$O_2 = 060A0A0E00A0A06 061A1A1E1E1A1A06 060A0E14141E1C 1C1C060A0E0EE6 0000000000000000 0000000000001F8$

Now we can build $X_0$ by constructing $0^{59}\|O_0\|0^{128} \oplus C_0$, starting with $C_0 = 1$, gives us $X'_0$, in hexadecimal format

$X'_0 = 0000000000000000 6162636465666668 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 7172737475767778 797A616263646566 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000$

which decompresses to a point on the curve sect571r1 immediately using the OctetString-to-ECPoint conversion routine in [11], where $y_p = \text{leftmost bit of } N_0$, $y_p = 0$ gives us the point $P_0$

$P_0 = (0000000000000000 6162636465666668 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 7172737475767778 797A616263646566 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 , 06023280BA1084E8 53FDFA74117D8351 E4CD2928344A5FB3 B50D292CAB0487D4 ABDA5275070E1ECC 68593B676134E007 48ABEC52B3B6075D 77833B892B35F67C 97EFFC9C5C7C01D9 )$

Which is added to $Q$, initialized as the point at infinity to become,

$Q_0 = (0000000000000000 6162636465666668 696A6B6C6D6E6F70 7172737475767778 797A616263646566 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 , 06023280BA1084E8 53FDFA74117D8351 E4CD2928344A5FB3 B50D292CAB0487D4 ABDA5275070E1ECC 68593B676134E007 48ABEC52B3B6075D 77833B892B35F67C 97EFFC9C5C7C01D9 )$

Now with $O_1$ we construct $X'_1 = 0^{59}\|O_1\|0^{128} \oplus C_1$, where $C_1$ starts = 1

$X'_1 = 0000000000000000 6768696A6B6C6D6E 6F70717273747576 7778797A61626364 65666768696A6B80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000$

which decompresses to a point on the curve sect571r1 immediately using the OctetString-to-ECPoint conversion routine in [11], where $y_p = \text{leftmost bit of } N_1$, $y_p = 0$ gives us the point $P_1$

$P_1 = (0000000000000000 6768696A6B6C6D6E 6F70717273747576 7778797A61626364 65666768696A6B80 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 , 0387314F6143173F 29EBA96F51C4E7 1B6BE9E5ABC36357 DB026250C88B8F2 257CD69F8004EBDD 5474D254F7C41A63 DED3BCD44745B0B9 354E125C083CE112 FD9350AF0CD89CD )$

Which is added to $Q$ to become,
Q_1 = (06311BD41C6CB86 7258756A39571FE8 0FC4C383B985CF31 5C167B80042646AB 98E700F4BAE6AFB5 ABC658FBC155AEDC 5498BE0589BD0F2 C52CA726A76B44C 5FABC7E74BB08D6 , 020CD10E355A305A 315F9FA157F228DF 5330BE8B051C7A18 FD9A1189C63C8569 6612006EEB9329B8 2F8F92FFC8FC65B6 B66102C48297EDED E9A914EF1565F78E 52D3C826BD3CB250 )

We can now construct the final block \( X'_2 = \text{with}^{0^{59}}\|O_2\|^{128} \oplus C_2 \) with \( C_2 = 1 \), gives us \( X'_2 \), in hexadecimal format

\[
X'_2 = \text{0000000000000000 060A0A0E0A0A06 061A1A1E1A1A06 060A0A0E1414141C 1C1C060A0A0E0EE6 000000000000001F8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000,}
\]

which again decompresses immediately to the point \( P_2 \)

\[
P_2 = (0000000000000000 060A0A0E0A0A06 061A1A1E1A1A06 060A0A0E1414141C 1C1C060A0A0E0EE6 0000000000000000 000000000000001F8 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 , 004D3AE2C2E680D 10A4D9C7664F443D BE370B6AF96406A ECB053984391369F 7B7CF596A9DA7C53 3CA556D0E49C4EE BE31B50EA37A9F4 13C3510E7D77A6D D7FAC7B19E55BCDF )
\]

\( P_2 \) is added to the \( Q \) value to result in

\[
Q_2 = (00E2F5EC93E7F9BD 39D9D09F93A320DA DF2BF9FFA2F7EC5B EABC909A4DD9CFC 915217DC96D1F6C B844D92BEB1C70F2 624FE83CB7AFCDF4 8002400F04A5C8A 3D336DB81B99AC2 , 0483978E802682EF 7B9CFA5C45F96794 4F8B99095A6BF4E7 3DFD41EFBD9ED18 60BD39AF8DDF7BBF C4B61DE6BE00F66A FBB037F49DC92DB 06FF42E2727F49AB DD753A829C3CC85 )
\]

We can interpret the \( x \)-coordinate as an multi-precision integer and divide by two taking the floor of the result, or simply dropping the remainder to get the following in hexadecimal format

\[
\left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_2)}{2} \right\rfloor = \text{00717AF649F3CFDE 9CECEC879C9D1906D 6F95FCFFD17BF62D F55E48546E9E7E4 48A90BEE4B68DFB6 5C22695F5E0B879 3127F1C65BD7EE7A 400120078250C645 1E986B5835CDBD61}
\]

Using this value as an integer we can multiply the base point of the curve to get,

\[
\left\lfloor \frac{x(Q_2)}{2} \right\rfloor G = (0052F6968D4E4078 E4CA24ACA4D2E9C3 305EEDD56678A890 4380D20F5058224 2312BAC171F6B3A9 823CE263E5769A4D 9C21B4F7B8058B1B 00560A3DC84664F7 1ED5462F1FA3822 , 0779600D4F72A682 2863B44C3B02128F A006CADAEB5F146 ECCC3977780D2693 A028F6582FDFF47 AFD3C3054194CF29 FD5AAC1B66D54465 F08A406A8E7BC7B 6AD49BC2640E5FD )
\]
Adding that value back with $Q_2$ above we get.

$$Q_2 + \lfloor x(Q_2)/2 \rfloor G = (07A658BF3ECCC401 328134D228C58B69 AE907C02518CC92D 3BBDE19CD10B119D D83DF56F838AB621 A111B616425410F6 9C861D53DD1E7631 2143CF25316DDC9C 81289F00785B0295, 01C3010607099A57 C63D7C7519B81B62 C630E3D629B77134 5F9EC34D17D0A253 30D25DF1AEA2ADFB 5BA8CE6B3E8058D9 B536E1BE513BA482 F2BF257D29DE976A 1324EA5D6589280)$$

And again interpreting the x-coordinate of the result as a multi-precision integer and dividing by 2 discarding the remainder to get

$$\lfloor x(Q + \lfloor x(Q_2)/2 \rfloor G)/2 \rfloor = (03D32C5F9F666200 99409A691462C5B4 D7483E0128C66496 9DDDF0CE688588CE EC1EFAB7C1C55B10 D088DB0B212A087B 4E430EA9EE8F3B18 90A1E79298B6EE4E 40944F803C2D814A)$$

From this result the rightmost 512-bits are extracted to get the message

$$H = 99409A691462C5B4D7483E0128C664969DDE0CE688588CEEC1EFAB7C1C55B10 D088DB0B212A087B4E430EA9EE8F3B1890A1E79298B6EE4E40944F803C2D814A$$