Difference between revisions of "Skein"

From The ECRYPT Hash Function Website
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|  near collision || compression function || 512 || 17 rounds || 2<sup>24</sup> || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/438.pdf Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici]
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|  near collision || compression function || 512 || 17 rounds (Round 1) || 2<sup>24</sup> || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/438.pdf Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici]
 
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|  distinguisher || block cipher || 512 || 35 rounds || 2<sup>478</sup> || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/438.pdf Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici]
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|  distinguisher || block cipher || 512 || 35 rounds (Round 1) || 2<sup>478</sup> || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/438.pdf Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici]
 
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|  impossible differential || block cipher || 512 || 21 rounds || - || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/438.pdf Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici]
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|  impossible differential || block cipher || 512 || 21 rounds (Round 1) || - || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/438.pdf Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici]
 
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|  key recovery || block cipher || 512 || 32 rounds || 2<sup>312</sup> || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/438.pdf Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici]
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|  key recovery || block cipher || 512 || 32 rounds (Round 1) || 2<sup>312</sup> || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/438.pdf Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici]
 
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|  key recovery || block cipher || 512 || 32 rounds || 2<sup>226</sup> (2<sup>222</sup>) || 2<sup>12</sup> || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/526.pdf Chen,Jia]
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|  key recovery || block cipher || 512 || 32 rounds (Round 1) || 2<sup>226</sup> (2<sup>222</sup>) || 2<sup>12</sup> || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/526.pdf Chen,Jia]
 
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|  key recovery || block cipher || 512 || 33 rounds || 2<sup>352.17</sup> (2<sup>355.5</sup>) || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/526.pdf Chen,Jia]
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|  key recovery || block cipher || 512 || 33 rounds (Round 1) || 2<sup>352.17</sup> (2<sup>355.5</sup>) || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/526.pdf Chen,Jia]
 
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Revision as of 11:19, 30 January 2010

1 The algorithm


Niels Ferguson, Stefan Lucks, Bruce Schneier, Doug Whiting, Mihir Bellare, Tadayoshi Kohno, Jon Callas, Jesse Walker - The Skein Hash Function Family

,2009
http://www.skein-hash.info/sites/default/files/skein1.2.pdf
Bibtex
Author : Niels Ferguson, Stefan Lucks, Bruce Schneier, Doug Whiting, Mihir Bellare, Tadayoshi Kohno, Jon Callas, Jesse Walker
Title : The Skein Hash Function Family
In : -
Address :
Date : 2009

Niels Ferguson, Stefan Lucks, Bruce Schneier, Doug Whiting, Mihir Bellare, Tadayoshi Kohno, Jon Callas, Jesse Walker - The Skein Hash Function Family

,2008
http://www.skein-hash.info/sites/default/files/skein.pdf
Bibtex
Author : Niels Ferguson, Stefan Lucks, Bruce Schneier, Doug Whiting, Mihir Bellare, Tadayoshi Kohno, Jon Callas, Jesse Walker
Title : The Skein Hash Function Family
In : -
Address :
Date : 2008


2 Cryptanalysis

We distinguish between two cases: results on the complete hash function, and results on underlying building blocks.

A description of the tables is given here.


2.1 Hash function

Here we list results on the actual hash function. The only allowed modification is to change the security parameter.

Recommended security parameter: 72 rounds

Type of Analysis Hash Size (n) Parameters Compression Function Calls Memory Requirements Reference


2.2 Building blocks

Here we list results on underlying building blocks, and the hash function modified by other means than the security parameter.

Note that these results assume more direct control or access over some internal variables (aka. free-start, pseudo, compression function, block cipher, or permutation attacks).

Type of Analysis Hash Function Part Hash Size (n) Parameters/Variants Compression Function Calls Memory Requirements Reference
near collision compression function 512 17 rounds (Round 1) 224 - Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici
distinguisher block cipher 512 35 rounds (Round 1) 2478 - Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici
impossible differential block cipher 512 21 rounds (Round 1) - - Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici
key recovery block cipher 512 32 rounds (Round 1) 2312 - Aumasson,Calik,Meier,Ozen,Phan,Varici
key recovery block cipher 512 32 rounds (Round 1) 2226 (2222) 212 Chen,Jia
key recovery block cipher 512 33 rounds (Round 1) 2352.17 (2355.5) - Chen,Jia



Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Cagdas Calik, Willi Meier, Onur Ozen, Raphael C.-W. Phan, Kerem Varici - Improved Cryptanalysis of Skein

,2009
http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/438.pdf
Bibtex
Author : Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Cagdas Calik, Willi Meier, Onur Ozen, Raphael C.-W. Phan, Kerem Varici
Title : Improved Cryptanalysis of Skein
In : -
Address :
Date : 2009

Jiazhe Chen, Keting Jia - Improved Related-key Boomerang Attacks on Round-Reduced Threefish-512

,2009
http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/526.pdf
Bibtex
Author : Jiazhe Chen, Keting Jia
Title : Improved Related-key Boomerang Attacks on Round-Reduced Threefish-512
In : -
Address :
Date : 2009

2.3 Archive

Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Willi Meier, Raphael Phan - Improved analyis of Threefish

,2009
http://131002.net/data/talks/threefish_rump.pdf
Bibtex
Author : Jean-Philippe Aumasson, Willi Meier, Raphael Phan
Title : Improved analyis of Threefish
In : -
Address :
Date : 2009