Difference between revisions of "SIMD"
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| Type of Analysis || Hash Function Part || Hash Size (n) || Parameters/Variants || Compression Function Calls || Memory Requirements || Reference | | Type of Analysis || Hash Function Part || Hash Size (n) || Parameters/Variants || Compression Function Calls || Memory Requirements || Reference | ||
|- | |- | ||
+ | | free-start near-collision || compression || 256 || 20 steps || 2<sup>107</sup> || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/304.pdf Yu, Wang] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | | free-start near-collision || compression || 512 || 24 steps || 2<sup>208</sup> || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/304.pdf Yu, Wang] | ||
+ | |- | ||
+ | | distinguisher || compression || 512 || full || 2<sup>398</sup> || - || [http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/304.pdf Yu, Wang] | ||
+ | |- | ||
| distinguisher || compression || 512 || 12 steps || 2<sup>236</sup> || - || [https://cryptolux.org/mediawiki/uploads/0/07/Rotational_distinguishers_%28Nikolic%2C_Pieprzyk%2C_Sokolowski%2C_Steinfeld%29.pdf Nikolić,Pieprzyk,Sokołowski,Steinfeld] | | distinguisher || compression || 512 || 12 steps || 2<sup>236</sup> || - || [https://cryptolux.org/mediawiki/uploads/0/07/Rotational_distinguishers_%28Nikolic%2C_Pieprzyk%2C_Sokolowski%2C_Steinfeld%29.pdf Nikolić,Pieprzyk,Sokołowski,Steinfeld] | ||
|- | |- | ||
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|} | |} | ||
+ | |||
+ | <bibtex> | ||
+ | @misc{cryptoeprint:2010:304, | ||
+ | author = {Hongbo Yu and Xiaoyun Wang}, | ||
+ | title = {Cryptanalysis of the Compression Function of SIMD}, | ||
+ | howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2010/304}, | ||
+ | url={http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/304.pdf}, | ||
+ | year = {2010}, | ||
+ | note = {\url{http://eprint.iacr.org/}}, | ||
+ | abstract={SIMD is one of the second round candidates of the SHA-3 competition hosted by NIST. In this paper, we present some results on the compression function of SIMD 1.1 (the tweaked version) using the modular difference method. For SIMD-256, We give a free-start near collision attack on the compression function reduced to 20 steps with complexity $2^{-107}$. And for SIMD-512, we give a free-start near collision attack on the 24-step compression function with complexity $2^{208}$. Furthermore, we give a distinguisher attack on the full compression function of SIMD-512 with complexity $2^{398}$. Our attacks are also applicable for the final compression function of SIMD.}, | ||
+ | } | ||
+ | </bibtex> | ||
<bibtex> | <bibtex> |
Revision as of 13:25, 27 May 2010
1 The algorithm
- Author(s): Gaëtan Leurent, Charles Bouillaguet, Pierre-Alain Fouque
- Website: http://www.di.ens.fr/~leurent/simd.html
- NIST submission package:
- round 1: SIMDUpdate.zip (old version: SIMD.zip)
- round 2: SIMD_Round2.zip
Gaëtan Leurent, Charles Bouillaguet, Pierre-Alain Fouque - SIMD Is a Message Digest
- ,2009
- http://www.di.ens.fr/~leurent/files/SIMD.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Gaëtan Leurent, Charles Bouillaguet, Pierre-Alain Fouque
Title : SIMD Is a Message Digest
In : -
Address :
Date : 2009
Gaëtan Leurent, Charles Bouillaguet, Pierre-Alain Fouque - SIMD Is a Message Digest
- ,2008
- http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/4/4e/Simd.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Gaëtan Leurent, Charles Bouillaguet, Pierre-Alain Fouque
Title : SIMD Is a Message Digest
In : -
Address :
Date : 2008
2 Cryptanalysis
We distinguish between two cases: results on the complete hash function, and results on underlying building blocks.
A description of the tables is given here.
Recommended security parameter: total number of steps = 32
2.1 Hash function
Here we list results on the hash function according to the NIST requirements. The only allowed modification is to change the security parameter.
Type of Analysis | Hash Size (n) | Parameters | Compression Function Calls | Memory Requirements | Reference |
2.2 Building blocks
Here we list results on underlying building blocks, and the hash function modified by other means than the security parameter.
Note that these results assume more direct control or access over some internal variables (aka. free-start, pseudo, compression function, block cipher, or permutation attacks).
Type of Analysis | Hash Function Part | Hash Size (n) | Parameters/Variants | Compression Function Calls | Memory Requirements | Reference |
free-start near-collision | compression | 256 | 20 steps | 2107 | - | Yu, Wang |
free-start near-collision | compression | 512 | 24 steps | 2208 | - | Yu, Wang |
distinguisher | compression | 512 | full | 2398 | - | Yu, Wang |
distinguisher | compression | 512 | 12 steps | 2236 | - | Nikolić,Pieprzyk,Sokołowski,Steinfeld |
distinguisher | compression | 512 | linear message exp., 24 steps | 2497 | - | Nikolić,Pieprzyk,Sokołowski,Steinfeld |
distinguisher | compression | 512 | full (Round 1) | 5*2425.28 | - | Mendel, Nad |
Hongbo Yu, Xiaoyun Wang - Cryptanalysis of the Compression Function of SIMD
- ,2010
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/304.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Hongbo Yu, Xiaoyun Wang
Title : Cryptanalysis of the Compression Function of SIMD
In : -
Address :
Date : 2010
Ivica Nikolić, Josef Pieprzyk, Przemysław Sokołowski, Ron Steinfeld - Rotational Cryptanalysis of (Modified) Versions of BMW and SIMD
- ,2010
- https://cryptolux.org/mediawiki/uploads/0/07/Rotational_distinguishers_%28Nikolic%2C_Pieprzyk%2C_Sokolowski%2C_Steinfeld%29.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Ivica Nikolić, Josef Pieprzyk, Przemysław Sokołowski, Ron Steinfeld
Title : Rotational Cryptanalysis of (Modified) Versions of BMW and SIMD
In : -
Address :
Date : 2010
Florian Mendel, Tomislav Nad - A Distinguisher for the Compression Function of SIMD-512