Difference between revisions of "SHAvite-3"
(Attacks on Hash Functions based on Generalized Feistel - Application to Reduced-Round Lesamnta and SHAvite-3) |
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=== Hash function === | === Hash function === | ||
− | Here we list results on the | + | Here we list results on the hash function according to the NIST requirements. The only allowed modification is to change the security parameter. |
Recommended security parameter: '''12''' rounds (n=224,256); '''14''' rounds (n=384,512) | Recommended security parameter: '''12''' rounds (n=224,256); '''14''' rounds (n=384,512) |
Revision as of 09:57, 16 February 2010
1 The algorithm
- Author(s): Eli Biham and Orr Dunkelman
- Website: http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~orrd/SHAvite-3/
- NIST submission package:
- round 1: SHAvite3Update.zip (old version: SHAvite-3.zip)
- round 2: SHAvite-3_Round2.zip
Eli Biham, Orr Dunkelman - The SHAvite-3 Hash Function
- ,2009
- http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~orrd/SHAvite-3/Spec.15.09.09.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Eli Biham, Orr Dunkelman
Title : The SHAvite-3 Hash Function
In : -
Address :
Date : 2009
Eli Biham, Orr Dunkelman - The SHAvite-3 Hash Function
- ,2008
- http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/f/f5/Shavite.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Eli Biham, Orr Dunkelman
Title : The SHAvite-3 Hash Function
In : -
Address :
Date : 2008
2 Cryptanalysis
We distinguish between two cases: results on the complete hash function, and results on underlying building blocks.
A description of the tables is given here.
2.1 Hash function
Here we list results on the hash function according to the NIST requirements. The only allowed modification is to change the security parameter.
Recommended security parameter: 12 rounds (n=224,256); 14 rounds (n=384,512)
Type of Analysis | Hash Size (n) | Parameters | Compression Function Calls | Memory Requirements | Reference |
second preimage | 512 | 9 rounds | 2496 | 216 | Bouillaguet et al. |
2.2 Building blocks
Here we list results on underlying building blocks, and the hash function modified by other means than the security parameter.
Note that these results assume more direct control or access over some internal variables (aka. free-start, pseudo, compression function, block cipher, or permutation attacks).
Type of Analysis | Hash Function Part | Hash Size (n) | Parameters/Variants | Compression Function Calls | Memory Requirements | Reference |
pseudo-collision | compression | all | full (Round 1) | Peyrin | ||
pseudo-collision | compression | 256 | full (Round 1) | Nandi,Paul | ||
impossible differential | block cipher | 224,256 | 5 rounds | - | - | submission document |
impossible differential | block cipher | 384,512 | 9 rounds | - | - | submission document |
Charles Bouillaguet, Orr Dunkelman, Ga\"etan Leurent, Pierre-Alain Fouque - Attacks on Hash Functions based on Generalized Feistel - Application to Reduced-Round Lesamnta and SHAvite-3_{512}
- ,2009
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/634.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Charles Bouillaguet, Orr Dunkelman, Ga\"etan Leurent, Pierre-Alain Fouque
Title : Attacks on Hash Functions based on Generalized Feistel - Application to Reduced-Round Lesamnta and SHAvite-3_{512}
In : -
Address :
Date : 2009
Thomas Peyrin - Chosen-salt, chosen-counter, pseudo-collision on SHAvite-3 compression function
- ,2009
- http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/e/ea/Peyrin-SHAvite-3.txt
BibtexAuthor : Thomas Peyrin
Title : Chosen-salt, chosen-counter, pseudo-collision on SHAvite-3 compression function
In : -
Address :
Date : 2009
Mridul Nandi, Souradyuti Paul - OFFICIAL COMMENT: SHAvite-3