Difference between revisions of "SHA-1"
From The ECRYPT Hash Function Website
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| − | <bibtex> | + | <bibtex> |
| + | @INPROCEEDINGS{Han2002Cryptanalysisofthe, | ||
| + | author = {Daewan Han and Sangwoo Park and Seongtaek Chee}, | ||
| + | title = {Cryptanalysis of the Modified Version of the Hash Function Proposed at PKC'98.}, | ||
| + | booktitle = {Fast Software Encryption, 9th International Workshop, FSE 2002, Leuven, Belgium, February 4-6, 2002, Revised Papers}, | ||
| + | year = {2002}, | ||
| + | editor = {Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen}, | ||
| + | volume = {2365}, | ||
| + | series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science}, | ||
| + | pages = {252-262}, | ||
| + | publisher = {Springer}, | ||
| + | } | ||
| + | </bibtex> | ||
* '''Collision Attacks''' | * '''Collision Attacks''' | ||
Revision as of 10:22, 17 October 2006
Contents
1 General
- digest size: 160 bits
- max. message length: < 264 bits
- type: iterative hash function
- compression function: 512-bit message block, 160-bit chaining variable
- Specification: FIPS 180-2 Secure Hash Standard
2 Cryptanalysis
2.1 Best Known Results
Here we summarize the best knonw (published) results.
2.2 Collection of Articles
Daewan Han, Sangwoo Park, Seongtaek Chee - Cryptanalysis of the Modified Version of the Hash Function Proposed at PKC'98.
- Fast Software Encryption, 9th International Workshop, FSE 2002, Leuven, Belgium, February 4-6, 2002, Revised Papers 2365:252-262,2002
- BibtexAuthor : Daewan Han, Sangwoo Park, Seongtaek Chee
Title : Cryptanalysis of the Modified Version of the Hash Function Proposed at PKC'98.
In : Fast Software Encryption, 9th International Workshop, FSE 2002, Leuven, Belgium, February 4-6, 2002, Revised Papers -
Address :
Date : 2002
- Collision Attacks
- Here I would list all papers that deal with SHA-1. We should also give the abstract and the bibtex entry for the corresponding paper. Additionall we should give our opinion about the attack described in the paper.
- Second Preimage Attacks
- There exists a generic attack (works for all iterated hash functions). See ....
- Preimage Attacks
- We are not aware of any article describing preimage attacks on SHA-1.
3 eHash Recommendation (optional) or eHash Opinion
Something like: SHA-1 is considered to be broken. Please do not incorporate SHA-1 in new application any longer. Try to migrate to another hash function.
