Difference between revisions of "RIPEMD-160"
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| − | == | + | == Specification == |
* digest size: 160 bits | * digest size: 160 bits | ||
* max. message length: < 2<sup>64</sup> bits | * max. message length: < 2<sup>64</sup> bits | ||
* compression function: 512-bit message block, 160-bit chaining variable | * compression function: 512-bit message block, 160-bit chaining variable | ||
| − | * Specification: | + | * Specification: [http://www.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html The RIPEMD-160 page] |
| + | |||
<bibtex> | <bibtex> | ||
@inproceedings{fseDobbertinBP96, | @inproceedings{fseDobbertinBP96, | ||
| − | |||
author = {Hans Dobbertin and Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel}, | author = {Hans Dobbertin and Antoon Bosselaers and Bart Preneel}, | ||
title = {RIPEMD-160: A Strengthened Version of RIPEMD}, | title = {RIPEMD-160: A Strengthened Version of RIPEMD}, | ||
| Line 36: | Line 36: | ||
=== Best Known Results === | === Best Known Results === | ||
| − | + | No attacks known. All results concern simplified variants. | |
---- | ---- | ||
| Line 46: | Line 46: | ||
=== Collision Attacks === | === Collision Attacks === | ||
| + | <bibtex> | ||
| + | @inproceedings{iswMendelPRR06, | ||
| + | author = {Florian Mendel and Norbert Pramstaller and Christian Rechberger and Vincent Rijmen}, | ||
| + | title = {On the Collision Resistance of RIPEMD-160}, | ||
| + | booktitle = {ISC}, | ||
| + | year = {2006}, | ||
| + | pages = {101-116}, | ||
| + | url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11836810_8}, | ||
| + | editor = {Sokratis K. Katsikas and Javier Lopez and Michael Backes and Stefanos Gritzalis and Bart Preneel}, | ||
| + | publisher = {Springer}, | ||
| + | series = {LNCS}, | ||
| + | volume = {4176}, | ||
| + | isbn = {3-540-38341-7}, | ||
| + | abstract = {In this article, the RIPEMD-160 hash function is studied in detail. To analyze the hash function, we have extended existing approaches and used recent results in cryptanalysis. While RIPEMD and RIPEMD-128 reduced to 3 rounds are vulnerable to the attack, it is not feasible for RIPEMD-160. Furthermore, we present an analytical attack on a round-reduced variant of the RIPEMD-160 hash function. To the best of our knowledge this is the first article that investigates the impact of recent advances in cryptanalysis of hash functions on RIPEMD-160.}, | ||
| + | } | ||
| + | </bibtex> | ||
---- | ---- | ||
Latest revision as of 14:16, 27 March 2008
Contents
1 Specification
- digest size: 160 bits
- max. message length: < 264 bits
- compression function: 512-bit message block, 160-bit chaining variable
- Specification: The RIPEMD-160 page
Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, Bart Preneel - RIPEMD-160: A Strengthened Version of RIPEMD
- FSE 1039:71-82,1996
- http://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~cosicart/pdf/AB-9601/AB-9601.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Bosselaers, Bart Preneel
Title : RIPEMD-160: A Strengthened Version of RIPEMD
In : FSE -
Address :
Date : 1996
2 Cryptanalysis
2.1 Best Known Results
No attacks known. All results concern simplified variants.
2.2 Generic Attacks
2.3 Collision Attacks
Florian Mendel, Norbert Pramstaller, Christian Rechberger, Vincent Rijmen - On the Collision Resistance of RIPEMD-160
- ISC 4176:101-116,2006
- http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11836810_8
BibtexAuthor : Florian Mendel, Norbert Pramstaller, Christian Rechberger, Vincent Rijmen
Title : On the Collision Resistance of RIPEMD-160
In : ISC -
Address :
Date : 2006
