Difference between revisions of "RIPEMD"

From The ECRYPT Hash Function Website
(Best Known Results)
(Collision Attacks)
 
Line 30: Line 30:
 
   year = {2005},
 
   year = {2005},
 
   pages = {1-18},
 
   pages = {1-18},
   abstract = {MD4 is a hash function developed by Rivest in 1990. It serves as the basis for most of the dedicated hash functions such as MD5, SHAx, RIPEMD, and HAVAL. In 1996, Dobbertin showed how to find collisions of MD4 with complexity equivalent to 220 MD4 hash computations. In this paper, we present a new attack on MD4 which can find a collision with probability 2–2 to 2–6, and the complexity of finding a collision doesnrsquot exceed 28 MD4 hash operations. Built upon the collision search attack, we present a chosen-message pre-image attack on MD4 with complexity below 28. Furthermore, we show that for a weak message, we can find another message that produces the same hash value. The complexity is only a single MD4 computation, and a random message is a weak message with probability 2–122. The attack on MD4 can be directly applied to RIPEMD which has two parallel copies of MD4, and the complexity of finding a collision is about 218 RIPEMD hash operations.},
+
   abstract = {MD4 is a hash function developed by Rivest in 1990. It serves as the basis for most of the dedicated hash functions such as MD5, SHAx, RIPEMD, and HAVAL. In 1996, Dobbertin showed how to find collisions of MD4 with complexity equivalent to 2^{20} MD4 hash computations. In this paper, we present a new attack on MD4 which can find a collision with probability 2^{–2} to 2^{–6}, and the complexity of finding a collision doesnrsquot exceed 2^8 MD4 hash operations. Built upon the collision search attack, we present a chosen-message pre-image attack on MD4 with complexity below 2^8. Furthermore, we show that for a weak message, we can find another message that produces the same hash value. The complexity is only a single MD4 computation, and a random message is a weak message with probability 2^{–122}. The attack on MD4 can be directly applied to RIPEMD which has two parallel copies of MD4, and the complexity of finding a collision is about 2^{18} RIPEMD hash operations.},
 
   editor = {Ronald Cramer},
 
   editor = {Ronald Cramer},
 
   volume = {3494},
 
   volume = {3494},

Latest revision as of 18:19, 11 March 2008

1 Specification

  • digest size: 128 bits
  • max. message length: < 264 bits
  • compression function: 512-bit message block, 2 streams with each 128-bit chaining variable
  • Specification:


2 Cryptanalysis

2.1 Best Known Results

The best collision attack on full RIPEMD was published by Wang et al. It has complexity of 218 hash evaluations.


2.2 Generic Attacks


2.3 Collision Attacks

Xiaoyun Wang, Xuejia Lai, Dengguo Feng, Hui Chen, Xiuyuan Yu - Cryptanalysis of the Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD

EUROCRYPT 3494:1-18,2005
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11426639_1
Bibtex
Author : Xiaoyun Wang, Xuejia Lai, Dengguo Feng, Hui Chen, Xiuyuan Yu
Title : Cryptanalysis of the Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD
In : EUROCRYPT -
Address :
Date : 2005

Christophe Debaert, Henri Gilbert - The RIPEMD and RIPEMD Improved Variants of MD4 Are Not Collision Free

FSE 2355:52-65,2002
http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/2355/23550052.htm
Bibtex
Author : Christophe Debaert, Henri Gilbert
Title : The RIPEMD and RIPEMD Improved Variants of MD4 Are Not Collision Free
In : FSE -
Address :
Date : 2002

Hans Dobbertin - RIPEMD with Two-Round Compress Function is Not Collision-Free

J. Cryptology 10(1):51-70,1997
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001459900019
Bibtex
Author : Hans Dobbertin
Title : RIPEMD with Two-Round Compress Function is Not Collision-Free
In : J. Cryptology -
Address :
Date : 1997

2.4 Second Preimage Attacks


2.5 Preimage Attacks


2.6 Others