Difference between revisions of "NaSHA"
From The ECRYPT Hash Function Website
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* Author(s): Smile Markovski, Aleksandra Mileva | * Author(s): Smile Markovski, Aleksandra Mileva | ||
| − | * Website: [http://inf.ugd.edu.mk/images/stories/file/Mileva/ | + | * Website: [http://inf.ugd.edu.mk/images/stories/file/Mileva/nasha_hf.html http://inf.ugd.edu.mk/images/stories/file/Mileva/nasha_hf.html] |
* NIST submission package: [http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/Round1/documents/NaSHA.zip NaSHA.zip] | * NIST submission package: [http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/sha-3/Round1/documents/NaSHA.zip NaSHA.zip] | ||
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year = {2009}, | year = {2009}, | ||
url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/026.pdf}, | url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/026.pdf}, | ||
| − | abstract = { In this paper, we present a collision attack on the hash function NaSHA for the output sizes 384-bit and 512-bit. This attack is based on the the weakness in the generate course of the state words and the fact that the quasigroup operation used in the compression function is only determined by partial state words. Its complexity is about $2^{128}$ (much lower than the complexity of the corresponding birthday attack) and its probability is more than $(1- \frac{2}{{2^{64} - 1}})^2$ ($\gg \frac{1}{2}$).}, | + | abstract = {In this paper, we present a collision attack on the hash function NaSHA for the output sizes 384-bit and 512-bit. This attack is based on the the weakness in the generate course of the state words and the fact that the quasigroup operation used in the compression function is only determined by partial state words. Its complexity is about $2^{128}$ (much lower than the complexity of the corresponding birthday attack) and its probability is more than $(1- \frac{2}{{2^{64} - 1}})^2$ ($\gg \frac{1}{2}$).}, |
| + | } | ||
| + | </bibtex> | ||
| + | |||
| + | <bibtex> | ||
| + | @misc{MarkovskiMDG-eprint:2009:034, | ||
| + | author = {Smile Markovski and Aleksandra Mileva and Vesna Dimitrova and Danilo Gligoroski}, | ||
| + | title = {On a Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-512}, | ||
| + | howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2009/034}, | ||
| + | year = {2009}, | ||
| + | url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/034.pdf}, | ||
| + | abstract = {A collision attack on NaSHA-512 was proposed by L. Ji et al. The claimed complexity of the attack is $2^{192}$. The proposed attack is realized by using a suitable differential pattern. In this note we show that the correct result that can be inferred from their differential pattern is in fact a conditional one. It can be stated correctly as follows: A collision attack on NaSHA-512 of complexity $k=1,2,\dots,2^{320}$ can be performed with an unknown probability of success $p_k$, where $ 0\le p_1\le p_2\le p_{2^{320}}\le 1$. Consequently, the attack proposed by L. Ji et al. can be considered only as a direction how a possible collision attack on NaSHA-512 could be realized. The birthday attack remains the best possible attack on NaSHA-512.} | ||
| + | } | ||
| + | </bibtex> | ||
| + | |||
| + | <bibtex> | ||
| + | @misc{MDD09, | ||
| + | author = {Smile Markovski and Aleksandra Mileva and Vesna Dimitrova}, | ||
| + | title = {On the Second Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-384/512}, | ||
| + | howpublished = {Available online}, | ||
| + | year = {2009}, | ||
| + | url = {http://inf.ugd.edu.mk/images/stories/file/Mileva/response.pdf}, | ||
} | } | ||
</bibtex> | </bibtex> | ||
Latest revision as of 15:48, 23 February 2009
1 The algorithm
- Author(s): Smile Markovski, Aleksandra Mileva
- Website: http://inf.ugd.edu.mk/images/stories/file/Mileva/nasha_hf.html
- NIST submission package: NaSHA.zip
Smile Markovski, Aleksandra Mileva - 2.B.1 Algorithm Specification
- ,2008
- http://inf.ugd.edu.mk/images/stories/file/Mileva/part2b1.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Smile Markovski, Aleksandra Mileva
Title : 2.B.1 Algorithm Specification
In : -
Address :
Date : 2008
2 Cryptanalysis
| Type of Analysis | Hash Function Part | Hash Size (n) | Parameters/Variants | Compression Function Calls | Memory Requirements | Reference |
| free-start collision | compression | all | 232 | ? | Nikolić,Khovratovich | |
| free-start preimage | compression | 224,256 | ~2128 | ? | Nikolić,Khovratovich | |
| free-start preimage | compression | 384,512 | ~2256 | ? | Nikolić,Khovratovich | |
| free-start collision | compression | all | - | - | Ji,Liangyu,Xu | |
| collision | hash | 512 | 2192 | ? | Ji,Liangyu,Xu | |
| collision | hash | 384,512 | 2128 | - | Z. Li, D. Li |
A description of this table is given here.
Ivica Nikolić, Dmitry Khovratovich - Free-start attacks on NaSHA
- ,2008
- http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/3/33/Free-start_attacks_on_Nasha.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Ivica Nikolić, Dmitry Khovratovich
Title : Free-start attacks on NaSHA
In : -
Address :
Date : 2008
Li Ji, Xu Liangyu, Guan Xu - Collision attack on NaSHA-512
- ,2008
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/519.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Li Ji, Xu Liangyu, Guan Xu
Title : Collision attack on NaSHA-512
In : -
Address :
Date : 2008
Zhimin Li, Daofeng Li - Collision Attack on NaSHA-384/512
- ,2009
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/026.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Zhimin Li, Daofeng Li
Title : Collision Attack on NaSHA-384/512
In : -
Address :
Date : 2009
Smile Markovski, Aleksandra Mileva, Vesna Dimitrova, Danilo Gligoroski - On a Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-512
- ,2009
- http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/034.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Smile Markovski, Aleksandra Mileva, Vesna Dimitrova, Danilo Gligoroski
Title : On a Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-512
In : -
Address :
Date : 2009
Smile Markovski, Aleksandra Mileva, Vesna Dimitrova - On the Second Conditional Collision Attack on NaSHA-384/512
