Difference between revisions of "MD5"
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== Specification == | == Specification == | ||
− | + | * digest size: 128 bits | |
− | * digest size: | ||
* max. message length: < 2<sup>64</sup> bits | * max. message length: < 2<sup>64</sup> bits | ||
− | * compression function: 512-bit message block, | + | * compression function: 512-bit message block, 128-bit chaining variable |
− | * Specification: | + | * Specification: [http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt RFC1321] |
− | |||
== Cryptanalysis == | == Cryptanalysis == | ||
Line 12: | Line 10: | ||
=== Best Known Results === | === Best Known Results === | ||
+ | |||
+ | The best known collision attack is due to Klima with a complexity of 2<sup>29</sup> effort. | ||
---- | ---- | ||
Line 21: | Line 21: | ||
=== Collision Attacks === | === Collision Attacks === | ||
+ | <bibtex> | ||
+ | @inproceedings{fseLeurent07, | ||
+ | author = {Gaëtan Leurent}, | ||
+ | title = {Message Freedom in MD4 and MD5 Collisions: Application to APOP}, | ||
+ | pages = {309-328}, | ||
+ | url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_20}, | ||
+ | editor = {Alex Biryukov}, | ||
+ | booktitle = {FSE}, | ||
+ | publisher = {Springer}, | ||
+ | series = {LNCS}, | ||
+ | volume = {4593}, | ||
+ | year = {2007}, | ||
+ | isbn = {978-3-540-74617-1}, | ||
+ | abstract = {In Wang’s attack, message modifications allow to | ||
+ | deterministically satisfy certain sufficient conditions to find | ||
+ | collisions efficiently. Unfortunately, message modifications | ||
+ | significantly change the messages and one has little control | ||
+ | over the colliding blocks. In this paper, we show how to choose | ||
+ | small parts of the colliding messages. Consequently, we break a | ||
+ | security countermeasure proposed by Szydlo and Yin at CT-RSA ’06, | ||
+ | where a fixed padding is added at the end of each block. Furthermore, | ||
+ | we also apply this technique to recover part of the passwords in the | ||
+ | Authentication Protocol of the Post Office Protocol (POP). This shows | ||
+ | that collision attacks can be used to attack real protocols, which means that finding collisions is a real threat.} | ||
+ | } | ||
+ | </bibtex> | ||
+ | <bibtex> | ||
+ | @inproceedings{eurocryptStevensLW07, | ||
+ | author = {Marc Stevens and Arjen K. Lenstra and Benne de Weger}, | ||
+ | title = {Chosen-Prefix Collisions for MD5 and Colliding X.509 Certificates for Different Identities}, | ||
+ | booktitle = {EUROCRYPT}, | ||
+ | year = {2007}, | ||
+ | pages = {1-22}, | ||
+ | abstract = {We present a novel, automated way to find differential paths for MD5. As an application we have shown how, at an approximate expected cost of 250 calls to the MD5 compression function, for any two chosen message prefixes P and P′, suffixes S and S′ can be constructed such that the concatenated values P||S and P′||S′ collide under MD5. Although the practical attack potential of this construction of chosen-prefix collisions is limited, it is of greater concern than random collisions for MD5. To illustrate the practicality of our method, we constructed two MD5 based X.509 certificates with identical signatures but different public keys and different Distinguished Name fields, whereas our previous construction of colliding X.509 certificates required identical name fields. We speculate on other possibilities for abusing chosen-prefix collisions. More details than can be included here can be found on www.win.tue.nl/hashclash/ChosenPrefixCollisions/.}, | ||
+ | editor = {Moni Naor}, | ||
+ | volume = {4515}, | ||
+ | series = {LNCS}, | ||
+ | publisher = {Springer}, | ||
+ | isbn = {978-3-540-72539-8}, | ||
+ | url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72540-4_1}, | ||
+ | } | ||
+ | </bibtex> | ||
<bibtex> | <bibtex> | ||
Line 60: | Line 102: | ||
abstract = {We introduce the idea of differential cryptanalysis mod 2^32 and apply it to the MD5 message digest algorithm. We derive a theory for differential cryptanalysis of the circular shift function. We demonstrate a high-probability differentials which leave the message digest register unchanged for each of MD5’s four rounds, and explain how more such differentials may be calculated.}, | abstract = {We introduce the idea of differential cryptanalysis mod 2^32 and apply it to the MD5 message digest algorithm. We derive a theory for differential cryptanalysis of the circular shift function. We demonstrate a high-probability differentials which leave the message digest register unchanged for each of MD5’s four rounds, and explain how more such differentials may be calculated.}, | ||
url = {http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/0658/06580071.htm}, | url = {http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/0658/06580071.htm}, | ||
+ | editor = {Rainer A. Rueppel}, | ||
+ | series = {LNCS}, | ||
+ | volume = {658}, | ||
+ | year = {1993}, | ||
} | } | ||
</bibtex> | </bibtex> | ||
Line 71: | Line 117: | ||
=== Preimage Attacks === | === Preimage Attacks === | ||
+ | <bibtex> | ||
+ | @inproceedings{acispSasakiA08, | ||
+ | author = {Yu Sasaki and Kazumaro Aoki}, | ||
+ | title = {Preimage Attacks on Step-Reduced MD5}, | ||
+ | booktitle = {ACISP}, | ||
+ | year = {2008}, | ||
+ | pages = {282-296}, | ||
+ | abstract = {In this paper, we propose preimage attacks on step-reduced MD5. We show that a preimage of a 44-step MD5 can be computed to a complexity of 2^96. We also consider a preimage attack against variants of MD5 where the round order is modified from the real MD5. In such a case, a preimage of a 51-step round-reordered MD5 can be computed to a complexity of 2^96. Our attack uses local collisions of MD5 to create a degree of message freedom. This freedom enables us to match the two 128-bit intermediate values efficiently.}, | ||
+ | url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70500-0_21}, | ||
+ | editor = {Yi Mu and Willy Susilo and Jennifer Seberry}, | ||
+ | publisher = {Springer}, | ||
+ | series = {LNCS}, | ||
+ | volume = {5107}, | ||
+ | isbn = {978-3-540-69971-2}, | ||
+ | } | ||
+ | </bibtex> | ||
---- | ---- |
Latest revision as of 15:20, 10 November 2008
Contents
1 Specification
- digest size: 128 bits
- max. message length: < 264 bits
- compression function: 512-bit message block, 128-bit chaining variable
- Specification: RFC1321
2 Cryptanalysis
2.1 Best Known Results
The best known collision attack is due to Klima with a complexity of 229 effort.
2.2 Generic Attacks
2.3 Collision Attacks
Gaëtan Leurent - Message Freedom in MD4 and MD5 Collisions: Application to APOP
- FSE 4593:309-328,2007
- http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_20
BibtexAuthor : Gaëtan Leurent
Title : Message Freedom in MD4 and MD5 Collisions: Application to APOP
In : FSE -
Address :
Date : 2007
Marc Stevens, Arjen K. Lenstra, Benne de Weger - Chosen-Prefix Collisions for MD5 and Colliding X.509 Certificates for Different Identities
- EUROCRYPT 4515:1-22,2007
- http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-72540-4_1
BibtexAuthor : Marc Stevens, Arjen K. Lenstra, Benne de Weger
Title : Chosen-Prefix Collisions for MD5 and Colliding X.509 Certificates for Different Identities
In : EUROCRYPT -
Address :
Date : 2007
Xiaoyun Wang, Hongbo Yu - How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions
- EUROCRYPT 3494:19-35,2005
- http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11426639_2
BibtexAuthor : Xiaoyun Wang, Hongbo Yu
Title : How to Break MD5 and Other Hash Functions
In : EUROCRYPT -
Address :
Date : 2005
Bert den Boer, Antoon Bosselaers - Collisions for the Compression Function of MD5
- EUROCRYPT pp. 293-304,1993
- http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/0765/07650293.htm
BibtexAuthor : Bert den Boer, Antoon Bosselaers
Title : Collisions for the Compression Function of MD5
In : EUROCRYPT -
Address :
Date : 1993
Thomas A. Berson - Differential Cryptanalysis Mod 2^32 with Applications to MD5
- EUROCRYPT 658:71-80,1993
- http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/0658/06580071.htm
BibtexAuthor : Thomas A. Berson
Title : Differential Cryptanalysis Mod 2^32 with Applications to MD5
In : EUROCRYPT -
Address :
Date : 1993
2.4 Second Preimage Attacks
2.5 Preimage Attacks
Yu Sasaki, Kazumaro Aoki - Preimage Attacks on Step-Reduced MD5
- ACISP 5107:282-296,2008
- http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-70500-0_21
BibtexAuthor : Yu Sasaki, Kazumaro Aoki
Title : Preimage Attacks on Step-Reduced MD5
In : ACISP -
Address :
Date : 2008
2.6 Others
John Black, Martin Cochran, Trevor Highland - A Study of the MD5 Attacks: Insights and Improvements