Difference between revisions of "MD4"

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* max. message length: < 2<sup>64</sup> bits
 
* max. message length: < 2<sup>64</sup> bits
 
* compression function: 512-bit message block, 128-bit chaining variable
 
* compression function: 512-bit message block, 128-bit chaining variable
−
* Specification:
+
* Specification: [http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1320.txt RFC1320]
 +
 
 +
<bibtex>
 +
@inproceedings{cryptoRivest90,
 +
  author    = {Ronald L. Rivest},
 +
  title    = {The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm},
 +
  booktitle = {CRYPTO},
 +
  year      = {1990},
 +
  pages    = {303-311},
 +
  url        = {http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/0537/05370303.htm},
 +
  editor    = {Alfred Menezes and Scott A. Vanstone},
 +
  publisher = {Springer},
 +
  series    = {LNCS},
 +
  volume    = {537},
 +
  isbn      = {3-540-54508-5},
 +
  editor    = {Alfred Menezes and Scott A. Vanstone},
 +
  publisher = {Springer},
 +
  series    = {LNCS},
 +
  volume    = {537},
 +
  isbn      = {3-540-54508-5},
 +
}
 +
</bibtex>
  
 
== Cryptanalysis ==
 
== Cryptanalysis ==
Line 19: Line 40:
  
 
=== Collision Attacks ===
 
=== Collision Attacks ===
 +
<bibtex>
 +
@inproceedings{iciscYuW07,
 +
  author    = {Hongbo Yu and Xiaoyun Wang},
 +
  title    = {Multi-collision Attack on the Compression Functions of MD4 and 3-Pass HAVAL},
 +
  booktitle = {ICISC},
 +
  year      = {2007},
 +
  pages    = {206-226},
 +
  url        = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76788-6_17},
 +
  editor    = {Kil-Hyun Nam and Gwangsoo Rhee},
 +
  publisher = {Springer},
 +
  series    = {LNCS},
 +
  volume    = {4817},
 +
  isbn      = {978-3-540-76787-9},
 +
  abstract  = {In this paper, we present a new type of multi-collision attack on the compression functions of both MD4 and 3-Pass HAVAL. Different from Joux’s multi-collision attack, our method focuses on the multi-collision of the compression function. For MD4, we utilize two different feasible collision differential paths to find a 4-collision with about 221 MD4 computations. For 3-Pass HAVAL, we can find a 4-collision with complexity about 2^{30} and a 8-near-collision with complexity 2^9.},
 +
}
 +
</bibtex>
 +
 +
<bibtex>
 +
@inproceedings{fseSasakiWOK07,
 +
  author    = {Yu Sasaki and Lei Wang and Kazuo Ohta and Noboru Kunihiro},
 +
  title    = {New Message Difference for MD4},
 +
  pages    = {329-348},
 +
  url        = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_21},
 +
  editor    = {Alex Biryukov},
 +
  booktitle = {FSE},
 +
  publisher = {Springer},
 +
  series    = {LNCS},
 +
  volume    = {4593},
 +
  year      = {2007},
 +
  isbn      = {978-3-540-74617-1},
 +
  abstract  = {This paper proposes several approaches to improve
 +
the collision attack on MD4 proposed by Wang et al. First, we
 +
propose a new local collision that is the best for the MD4 collision
 +
attack. Selection of a good message difference is the most important
 +
step in achieving effective collision attacks. This is the first paper
 +
to introduce an improvement to the message difference approach of
 +
Wang et al., where we propose a new local collision. Second, we propose
 +
a new algorithm for constructing differential paths. While similar
 +
algorithms have been proposed, they do not support the new local collision
 +
technique.Finally, we complete a collision attack, and show that the
 +
complexity is smaller than the previous best work.}
 +
}
 +
</bibtex>
 +
 +
<bibtex>
 +
@inproceedings{fseLeurent07,
 +
  author    = {Ga&euml;tan Leurent},
 +
  title    = {Message Freedom in MD4 and MD5 Collisions: Application to APOP},
 +
  pages    = {309-328},
 +
  url        = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_20},
 +
  editor    = {Alex Biryukov},
 +
  booktitle = {FSE},
 +
  publisher = {Springer},
 +
  series    = {LNCS},
 +
  volume    = {4593},
 +
  year      = {2007},
 +
  isbn      = {978-3-540-74617-1},
 +
  abstract  = {In Wang’s attack, message modifications allow to
 +
deterministically satisfy certain sufficient conditions to find
 +
collisions efficiently. Unfortunately, message modifications
 +
significantly change the messages and one has little control
 +
over the colliding blocks. In this paper, we show how to choose
 +
small parts of the colliding messages. Consequently, we break a
 +
security countermeasure proposed by Szydlo and Yin at CT-RSA ’06,
 +
where a fixed padding is added at the end of each block. Furthermore,
 +
we also apply this technique to recover part of the passwords in the
 +
Authentication Protocol of the Post Office Protocol (POP). This shows
 +
that collision attacks can be used to attack real protocols, which means that finding collisions is a real threat.}
 +
}
 +
</bibtex>
 +
 +
<bibtex>
 +
@inproceedings{iciscNaitoSKO05,
 +
  author    = {Yusuke Naito and Yu Sasaki and Noboru Kunihiro and Kazuo Ohta},
 +
  title    = {Improved Collision Attack on MD4 with Probability Almost 1},
 +
  booktitle = {ICISC},
 +
  year      = {2005},
 +
  pages    = {129-145},
 +
  url        = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11734727_12},
 +
  editor    = {Dongho Won and Seungjoo Kim},
 +
  publisher = {Springer},
 +
  series    = {LNCS},
 +
  volume    = {3935},
 +
  isbn      = {3-540-33354-1},
 +
  abstract  = {In EUROCRYPT2005, a collision attack on MD4 was proposed by Wang, Lai, Chen, and Yu. They claimed that collision messages were found with probability 2^{-6} to 2^{-2}, and the complexity was less than 2^8 MD4 hash operations. However, there were some tyops and oversights in their paper. In this paper, first, we reevaluate the exact success probability. Second, we point out the typos and oversights in the paper of Wang et al, and we show how to improve them. Third, we propose a new message modification method for the third round of MD4. From the first result, we reevaluate that the method of Wang et al. can find collision messages with success probability 2^{-5.61}. From the second result, we can find collision messages with success probability 2^{-2}. Also by combining the second result and the third result, our improved method is able to find collision messages with probability almost 1. This complexity is less than 3 repetitions of MD4 hash operations. Our improved method is about 85 times as fast as the method of Wang et al.},
 +
}
 +
</bibtex>
 +
 +
<bibtex>
 +
@inproceedings{eurocryptWangLFCY05,
 +
  author = {Xiaoyun Wang and Xuejia Lai and Dengguo Feng and Hui Chen and Xiuyuan Yu},
 +
  title = {Cryptanalysis of the Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD},
 +
  booktitle = {EUROCRYPT},
 +
  year = {2005},
 +
  pages = {1-18},
 +
  abstract = {MD4 is a hash function developed by Rivest in 1990. It serves as the basis for most of the dedicated hash functions such as MD5, SHAx, RIPEMD, and HAVAL. In 1996, Dobbertin showed how to find collisions of MD4 with complexity equivalent to 220 MD4 hash computations. In this paper, we present a new attack on MD4 which can find a collision with probability 2–2 to 2–6, and the complexity of finding a collision doesnrsquot exceed 28 MD4 hash operations. Built upon the collision search attack, we present a chosen-message pre-image attack on MD4 with complexity below 28. Furthermore, we show that for a weak message, we can find another message that produces the same hash value. The complexity is only a single MD4 computation, and a random message is a weak message with probability 2–122. The attack on MD4 can be directly applied to RIPEMD which has two parallel copies of MD4, and the complexity of finding a collision is about 218 RIPEMD hash operations.},
 +
  editor = {Ronald Cramer},
 +
  volume = {3494},
 +
  series = {LNCS},
 +
  publisher = {Springer},
 +
  isbn = {3-540-25910-4},
 +
  url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11426639_1},
 +
}
 +
</bibtex>
  
 
<bibtex>
 
<bibtex>
Line 36: Line 161:
 
<bibtex>
 
<bibtex>
 
@inproceedings{fseDobbertin96,
 
@inproceedings{fseDobbertin96,
−
  owner    = {tnad},
 
 
   author    = {Hans Dobbertin},
 
   author    = {Hans Dobbertin},
 
   title    = {Cryptanalysis of MD4},
 
   title    = {Cryptanalysis of MD4},
Line 61: Line 185:
 
<bibtex>
 
<bibtex>
 
@inproceedings{fseVaudenay94,
 
@inproceedings{fseVaudenay94,
−
  owner    = {tnad},
 
 
   author    = {Serge Vaudenay},
 
   author    = {Serge Vaudenay},
 
   title    = {On the Need for Multipermutations: Cryptanalysis of MD4 and SAFER},
 
   title    = {On the Need for Multipermutations: Cryptanalysis of MD4 and SAFER},
Line 86: Line 209:
 
}  
 
}  
 
</bibtex>
 
</bibtex>
 +
 +
<bibtex>
 +
@inproceedings{cryptoBoerB91,
 +
  author    = {Bert den Boer and Antoon Bosselaers},
 +
  title    = {An Attack on the Last Two Rounds of MD4},
 +
  booktitle = {CRYPTO},
 +
  year      = {1991},
 +
  pages    = {194-203},
 +
  url        = {http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/0576/05760194.htm},
 +
  editor    = {Joan Feigenbaum},
 +
  publisher = {Springer},
 +
  series    = {LNCS},
 +
  volume    = {576},
 +
  isbn      = {3-540-55188-3},
 +
}
 +
</bibtex>
 +
 
----
 
----
  
Line 94: Line 234:
 
=== Preimage Attacks ===
 
=== Preimage Attacks ===
  
 +
<bibtex>
 +
@inproceedings{fseLeurent08,
 +
  author    = {Ga{\"e}tan Leurent},
 +
  title    = {MD4 is Not One-Way},
 +
  booktitle = {FSE},
 +
  year      = {2008},
 +
  pages    = {412-428},
 +
  abstract  = {MD4 is a hash function introduced by Rivest in 1990. It is still used in some contexts, and the most commonly used hash functions (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-2) are based on the design principles of MD4. MD4 has been extensively studied and very efficient collision attacks are known, but it is still believed to be a one-way function. In this paper we show a partial pseudo-preimage attack on the compression function of MD4, using some ideas from previous cryptanalysis of MD4. We can choose 64 bits of the output for the cost of 2^32 compression function computations (the remaining bits are randomly chosen by the preimage algorithm). This gives a preimage attack on the compression function of MD4 with complexity 2^96, and we extend it to an attack on the full MD4 with complexity 2^102. As far as we know this is the first preimage attack on a member of the MD4 family. },
 +
  url        = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71039-4_26},
 +
  editor    = {Kaisa Nyberg},
 +
  publisher = {Springer},
 +
  series    = {LNCS},
 +
  volume    = {5086},
 +
  isbn      = {978-3-540-71038-7},
 +
}
 +
</bibtex>
 +
 +
<bibtex>
 +
@inproceedings{fseDobbertin98,
 +
  owner    = {tnad},
 +
  author    = {Hans Dobbertin},
 +
  title    = {The First Two Rounds of MD4 are Not One-Way},
 +
  pages    = {284-292},
 +
  editor    = {Serge Vaudenay},
 +
  booktitle = {FSE},
 +
  publisher = {Springer},
 +
  series    = {LNCS},
 +
  volume    = {1372},
 +
  year      = {1998},
 +
  isbn      = {3-540-64265-X},
 +
  abstract  = {In [1] it was shown that there are very effective attacks leading
 +
              to collisions for the hash function MD4 designed by R. Rivest [3].
 +
              A summary of the status of hash functions of the MD4-family with respect to
 +
              collision-resistence can be found in [2] and [4]. However, attacking the one-wayness
 +
              of a hash function is a much more demanding challenge, and in case of success it has much more devastating
 +
              consequences. No result along this line is known for MD4 and its
 +
              successors. Therefore it is worth to explore how the recently developed
 +
              new analytic methods for finding collisions can be applied to construct
 +
              preimages or second preimages. As a first step, we state here the following partial result.},
 +
  url      = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-69710-1_19}
 +
}
 +
</bibtex>
  
 
----
 
----
  
 
=== Others ===
 
=== Others ===
 +
<bibtex>
 +
@inproceedings{fseSchlafferO06,
 +
  author    = {Martin Schläffer and Elisabeth Oswald},
 +
  title    = {Searching for Differential Paths in MD4},
 +
  pages    = {242-261},
 +
  url        = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11799313_16},
 +
  booktitle = {FSE},
 +
  publisher = {Springer},
 +
  series    = {LNCS},
 +
  volume    = {4047},
 +
  year      = {2006},
 +
  isbn      = {3-540-36597-4},
 +
  abstract  = {The ground-breaking results of Wang et al.
 +
have attracted a lot of attention to the collision resistance
 +
of hash functions. In their articles, Wang et al. give input
 +
differences, differential paths and the corresponding conditions
 +
that allow to find collisions with a high probability. However,
 +
Wang et al. do not explain how these paths were found. The common
 +
assumption is that they were found by hand with a great deal of intuition.
 +
In this article, we present an algorithm that allows to find paths
 +
in an automated way. Our algorithm is successful for MD4. We have found
 +
over 1000 differential paths so far. Amongst them, there are paths that
 +
have fewer conditions in the second round than the path of Wang et al.
 +
for MD4. This makes them better suited for the message modification techniques
 +
that were also introduced by Wang et al.}
 +
}

Latest revision as of 11:32, 10 November 2008

1 Specification

  • digest size: 128 bits
  • max. message length: < 264 bits
  • compression function: 512-bit message block, 128-bit chaining variable
  • Specification: RFC1320

Ronald L. Rivest - The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm

CRYPTO 537:303-311,1990
http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/0537/05370303.htm
Bibtex
Author : Ronald L. Rivest
Title : The MD4 Message Digest Algorithm
In : CRYPTO -
Address :
Date : 1990

2 Cryptanalysis

2.1 Best Known Results

2.2 Generic Attacks

2.3 Collision Attacks

Hongbo Yu, Xiaoyun Wang - Multi-collision Attack on the Compression Functions of MD4 and 3-Pass HAVAL

ICISC 4817:206-226,2007
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76788-6_17
Bibtex
Author : Hongbo Yu, Xiaoyun Wang
Title : Multi-collision Attack on the Compression Functions of MD4 and 3-Pass HAVAL
In : ICISC -
Address :
Date : 2007

Yu Sasaki, Lei Wang, Kazuo Ohta, Noboru Kunihiro - New Message Difference for MD4

FSE 4593:329-348,2007
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_21
Bibtex
Author : Yu Sasaki, Lei Wang, Kazuo Ohta, Noboru Kunihiro
Title : New Message Difference for MD4
In : FSE -
Address :
Date : 2007

Gaëtan Leurent - Message Freedom in MD4 and MD5 Collisions: Application to APOP

FSE 4593:309-328,2007
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-74619-5_20
Bibtex
Author : Gaëtan Leurent
Title : Message Freedom in MD4 and MD5 Collisions: Application to APOP
In : FSE -
Address :
Date : 2007

Yusuke Naito, Yu Sasaki, Noboru Kunihiro, Kazuo Ohta - Improved Collision Attack on MD4 with Probability Almost 1

ICISC 3935:129-145,2005
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11734727_12
Bibtex
Author : Yusuke Naito, Yu Sasaki, Noboru Kunihiro, Kazuo Ohta
Title : Improved Collision Attack on MD4 with Probability Almost 1
In : ICISC -
Address :
Date : 2005

Xiaoyun Wang, Xuejia Lai, Dengguo Feng, Hui Chen, Xiuyuan Yu - Cryptanalysis of the Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD

EUROCRYPT 3494:1-18,2005
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11426639_1
Bibtex
Author : Xiaoyun Wang, Xuejia Lai, Dengguo Feng, Hui Chen, Xiuyuan Yu
Title : Cryptanalysis of the Hash Functions MD4 and RIPEMD
In : EUROCRYPT -
Address :
Date : 2005

Hans Dobbertin - Cryptanalysis of MD4

J. Cryptology 11(4):253-271,1998
http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00145/bibs/11n4p253.html
Bibtex
Author : Hans Dobbertin
Title : Cryptanalysis of MD4
In : J. Cryptology -
Address :
Date : 1998

Hans Dobbertin - Cryptanalysis of MD4

FSE 1039:53-69,1996
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001459900047
Bibtex
Author : Hans Dobbertin
Title : Cryptanalysis of MD4
In : FSE -
Address :
Date : 1996

Serge Vaudenay - On the Need for Multipermutations: Cryptanalysis of MD4 and SAFER

FSE 1008:286-297,1995
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-60590-8_22
Bibtex
Author : Serge Vaudenay
Title : On the Need for Multipermutations: Cryptanalysis of MD4 and SAFER
In : FSE -
Address :
Date : 1995

Bert den Boer, Antoon Bosselaers - An Attack on the Last Two Rounds of MD4

CRYPTO 576:194-203,1991
http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/0576/05760194.htm
Bibtex
Author : Bert den Boer, Antoon Bosselaers
Title : An Attack on the Last Two Rounds of MD4
In : CRYPTO -
Address :
Date : 1991

2.4 Second Preimage Attacks

2.5 Preimage Attacks

Ga\"etan Leurent - MD4 is Not One-Way

FSE 5086:412-428,2008
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71039-4_26
Bibtex
Author : Ga\"etan Leurent
Title : MD4 is Not One-Way
In : FSE -
Address :
Date : 2008

Hans Dobbertin - The First Two Rounds of MD4 are Not One-Way

FSE 1372:284-292,1998
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-69710-1_19
Bibtex
Author : Hans Dobbertin
Title : The First Two Rounds of MD4 are Not One-Way
In : FSE -
Address :
Date : 1998

2.6 Others

<bibtex> @inproceedings{fseSchlafferO06, 

 author    = {Martin Schläffer and Elisabeth Oswald},
 title     = {Searching for Differential Paths in MD4},
 pages     = {242-261},
 url        = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/11799313_16},
 booktitle = {FSE},
 publisher = {Springer},
 series    = {LNCS},
 volume    = {4047},
 year      = {2006},
 isbn      = {3-540-36597-4},
 abstract  = {The ground-breaking results of Wang et al.

have attracted a lot of attention to the collision resistance of hash functions. In their articles, Wang et al. give input differences, differential paths and the corresponding conditions that allow to find collisions with a high probability. However, Wang et al. do not explain how these paths were found. The common assumption is that they were found by hand with a great deal of intuition. In this article, we present an algorithm that allows to find paths in an automated way. Our algorithm is successful for MD4. We have found over 1000 differential paths so far. Amongst them, there are paths that have fewer conditions in the second round than the path of Wang et al. for MD4. This makes them better suited for the message modification techniques that were also introduced by Wang et al.} }

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