Difference between revisions of "LASH-n"
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| − | == | + | == Specification == |
| − | * digest size: 160 bits | + | * digest size: 160,256,384,512 bits |
| − | * max. message length: | + | * max. message length: arbitrary length |
| − | * compression function: | + | * compression function: 640,1024,1536,2048-bit message blocks and 640,1024,1536,2048-bit state size |
| + | <!-- | ||
* Specification: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/documents/SAARINEN_lash4-1_ORIG.pdf | * Specification: http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/documents/SAARINEN_lash4-1_ORIG.pdf | ||
| + | --> | ||
<bibtex> | <bibtex> | ||
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=== Best Known Results === | === Best Known Results === | ||
| + | LASH-n is vulnerable to attacks that trade time for memory, including collision attacks as fast as 2<sup>(4n/11)</sup> and preimage attacks as fast as 2<sup>(4n/7)</sup>. | ||
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=== Collision Attacks === | === Collision Attacks === | ||
| + | |||
| + | <bibtex> | ||
| + | @inproceedings{fseSteinfeldCMPGLW08, | ||
| + | author = {Ron Steinfeld and Scott Contini and Krystian Matusiewicz and Josef Pieprzyk and Jian Guo and San Ling and Huaxiong Wang}, | ||
| + | title = {Cryptanalysis of LASH}, | ||
| + | booktitle = {FSE}, | ||
| + | year = {2008}, | ||
| + | pages = {207-223}, | ||
| + | abstract = {We show that the LASH-x hash function is vulnerable to attacks that trade time for memory, including collision attacks as fast as 2(4x/11) and preimage attacks as fast as 2^(4x/7). Moreover, we briefly mention heuristic lattice based collision attacks that use small memory but require very long messages that are expected to find collisions much faster than 2^x/2. All of these attacks exploit the designers’ choice of an all zero IV. We then consider whether LASH can be patched simply by changing the IV. In this case, we show that LASH is vulnerable to a 2^(7x/8) preimage attack. We also show that LASH is trivially not a PRF when any subset of input bytes is used as a secret key. None of our attacks depend upon the particular contents of the LASH matrix - we only assume that the distribution of elements is more or less uniform. Additionally, we show a generalized birthday attack on the final compression of LASH which requires $O\left(x2^{\frac{x}{2(1+\frac{107}{105})}}\right) \approx O(x2^{x/4})$ time and memory. Our method extends the Wagner algorithm to truncated sums, as is done in the final transform in LASH.}, | ||
| + | url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71039-4_13}, | ||
| + | editor = {Kaisa Nyberg}, | ||
| + | publisher = {Springer}, | ||
| + | series = {LNCS}, | ||
| + | volume = {5086}, | ||
| + | isbn = {978-3-540-71038-7}, | ||
| + | } | ||
| + | </bibtex> | ||
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Latest revision as of 12:34, 10 November 2008
Contents
1 Specification
- digest size: 160,256,384,512 bits
- max. message length: arbitrary length
- compression function: 640,1024,1536,2048-bit message blocks and 640,1024,1536,2048-bit state size
Kamel Bentahar, Dan Page, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen, Joseph H. Silverman, Nigel Smart - LASH
- ,2006
- http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/documents/SAARINEN_lash4-1_ORIG.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Kamel Bentahar, Dan Page, Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen, Joseph H. Silverman, Nigel Smart
Title : LASH
In : -
Address :
Date : 2006
2 Cryptanalysis
2.1 Best Known Results
LASH-n is vulnerable to attacks that trade time for memory, including collision attacks as fast as 2(4n/11) and preimage attacks as fast as 2(4n/7).
2.2 Generic Attacks
2.3 Collision Attacks
Ron Steinfeld, Scott Contini, Krystian Matusiewicz, Josef Pieprzyk, Jian Guo, San Ling, Huaxiong Wang - Cryptanalysis of LASH
- FSE 5086:207-223,2008
- http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-71039-4_13
BibtexAuthor : Ron Steinfeld, Scott Contini, Krystian Matusiewicz, Josef Pieprzyk, Jian Guo, San Ling, Huaxiong Wang
Title : Cryptanalysis of LASH
In : FSE -
Address :
Date : 2008
