Difference between revisions of "LAKE"

Revision as of 14:16, 3 November 2008

Florian Mendel, Martin Schl\"affer - Collisions for Round-Reduced LAKE

ACISP 5107:267-281,2008

Author : Florian Mendel, Martin Schl\"affer
Title : Collisions for Round-Reduced LAKE
In : ACISP -
Address :
Date : 2008

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 === Collision Attacks ===
+<bibtex>
+@inproceedings{acispMendelS08,
+  author    = {Florian Mendel and Martin Schl{\"a}ffer},
+  title     = {Collisions for Round-Reduced LAKE},
+  booktitle = {ACISP},
+  year      = {2008},
+  pages     = {267-281},
+  url       = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/882420671673224r/},
+  editor    = {Yi Mu and Willy Susilo and Jennifer Seberry},
+  publisher = {Springer},
+  series    = {LNCS},
+  volume    = {5107},
+  isbn      = {978-3-540-69971-2},
+  abstract  = {LAKE is a family of cryptographic hash functions presented at FSE 2008. It is an iterated hash function and defines two main instances with a 256 bit and 512 bit hash value. In this paper, we present the first security analysis of LAKE. We show how collision attacks, exploiting the non-bijectiveness of the internal compression function of LAKE, can be mounted on reduced variants of LAKE. We show an efficient attack on the 256 bit hash function LAKE-256 reduced to 3 rounds and present an actual colliding message pair. Furthermore, we present a theoretical attack on LAKE-256 reduced to 4 rounds with a complexity of $2^{109}$. By using more sophisticated message modification techniques we expect that the attack can be extended to 5 rounds. However, for the moment our approach does not appear to be applicable to the full LAKE-256 hash function (with all 8 rounds).},
+}
+</bibtex>
 ----