Difference between revisions of "HAVAL"

Revision as of 18:16, 10 March 2008

digest size: 128,160,192,224,256 bits
max. message length: < 2⁶⁴ bits
compression function: 1024-bit message block, 3/4/5 passes with 256-bit chaining variable
Specification:

Yuliang Zheng, Josef Pieprzyk, Jennifer Seberry - HAVAL - A One-Way Hashing Algorithm with Variable Length of Output

ASIACRYPT 718:83-104,1993

Author : Yuliang Zheng, Josef Pieprzyk, Jennifer Seberry
Title : HAVAL - A One-Way Hashing Algorithm with Variable Length of Output
In : ASIACRYPT -
Address :
Date : 1993

Bart Van Rompay, Alex Biryukov, Bart Preneel, Joos Vandewalle - Cryptanalysis of 3-Pass HAVAL

ASIACRYPT 2894:228-245,2003

Author : Bart Van Rompay, Alex Biryukov, Bart Preneel, Joos Vandewalle
Title : Cryptanalysis of 3-Pass HAVAL
In : ASIACRYPT -
Address :
Date : 2003

@@ Line 37: / Line 37: @@
 === Collision Attacks ===
+<bibtex>
+@inproceedings{asiacryptRompayBPV03,
+  author    = {Bart Van Rompay and Alex Biryukov and Bart Preneel and Joos Vandewalle},
+  title     = {Cryptanalysis of 3-Pass HAVAL},
+  pages     = {228-245},
+  url        = {http://springerlink.metapress.com/openurl.asp?genre=article{\&}issn=0302-9743{\&}volume=2894{\&}spage=228},
+  editor    = {Chi-Sung Laih},
+  booktitle = {ASIACRYPT},
+  publisher = {Springer},
+  series    = {LNCS},
+  volume    = {2894},
+  year      = {2003},
+  isbn      = {3-540-20592-6},
+  abstract  = {HAVAL is a cryptographic hash function proposed in 1992 by Zheng, Pieprzyk and Seberry. Its has a structure that is quite similar to other well-known hash functions such as MD4 and MD5. The specification of HAVAL includes a security parameter: the number of passes (that is, the number of times that a particular word of the message is used in the computation) can be chosen equal to 3, 4 or 5. In this paper we describe a practical attack that finds collisions for the 3-pass version of HAVAL. This means that it is possible to generate pairs of messages hashing to the same value. The computational complexity of the attack corresponds to about $2^29$ computations of the compression function of 3-pass HAVAL; the required amount of memory is negligible.},
+}
+</bibtex>
 ----