Difference between revisions of "FFT-Hash I"

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== Spezification ==
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== Specification ==
  
 
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=== Collision Attacks ===
 
=== Collision Attacks ===
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<bibtex>
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@inproceedings{eurocryptBaritaudGG92,
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  author = {Thierry Baritaud and Henri Gilbert and Marc Girault},
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  title = {FFT Hashing is not Collision-free},
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  booktitle = {EUROCRYPT},
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  year = {1992},
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  pages = {35-44},
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  abstract = {The FFT Hashing Function proposed by C.P. Schnorr [1] hashes messages of arbitrary length into a 128-bit hash value. In this paper, we show that this function is not collision free, and we give an example of two distinct 256-bit messages with the same hash value. Finding a collision (in fact a large family of, colliding messages) requires approximately 223 partial computations of the hash function, and takes a few hours on a SUN3- workstation, and less than an hour on a SPARC-workstation. A similar result discovered independently has been announced at the Asiacrypt’91 rump session by Daemen-Bosselaers-Govaerts-Vandewalle [2].},
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  url = {http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/0658/06580035.htm},
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  editor    = {Rainer A. Rueppel},
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  series    = {LNCS},
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  volume    = {658},
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  year      = {1993},
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}
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</bibtex>
  
 
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Latest revision as of 14:48, 10 November 2008

1 Specification

2 Cryptanalysis

2.1 Best Known Results


2.2 Generic Attacks


2.3 Collision Attacks

Thierry Baritaud, Henri Gilbert, Marc Girault - FFT Hashing is not Collision-free

EUROCRYPT 658:35-44,1993
http://link.springer.de/link/service/series/0558/bibs/0658/06580035.htm
Bibtex
Author : Thierry Baritaud, Henri Gilbert, Marc Girault
Title : FFT Hashing is not Collision-free
In : EUROCRYPT -
Address :
Date : 1993

2.4 Second Preimage Attacks


2.5 Preimage Attacks


2.6 Others