Difference between revisions of "Blender"
From The ECRYPT Hash Function Website
(Newbold's attack on Blender added) |
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== Cryptanalysis == | == Cryptanalysis == | ||
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+ | <bibtex> | ||
+ | @misc{blenderN08, | ||
+ | author = {Craig Newbold}, | ||
+ | title = {Observations and Attacks On The SHA-3 Candidate Blender }, | ||
+ | howpublished = {Available online}, | ||
+ | url = {http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/2/20/Observations_on_Blender.pdf}, | ||
+ | year = {2008}, | ||
+ | abstract = {51 candidates have been accepted as first round candidates in NIST‘s | ||
+ | SHA-3 competition, to decide the new cryptographic hash standard. Many | ||
+ | of these submissions have no external cryptanalysis published, so the task | ||
+ | begins to analyse their security and eliminate those that have vulnerabili- | ||
+ | ties. In what we believe to be the first published external cryptananalysis | ||
+ | of one candidate, Blender, we make observations on its structure, then | ||
+ | exploit these features to give a multicollision attack of time complex- | ||
+ | ity around $2^{\frac{n+w}2}$ , and a first preimage attack of time complexity around | ||
+ | $n2^{\frac{n+w}2}$. Both attacks have minimal space requirements, so we believe that | ||
+ | this constitutes a break of Blender. We then leave possible improvements | ||
+ | on these attacks as open problems.}, | ||
+ | } | ||
+ | </bibtex> | ||
<bibtex> | <bibtex> | ||
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author = {Liangyu Xu}, | author = {Liangyu Xu}, | ||
title = {Semi-free start collision attack on Blender}, | title = {Semi-free start collision attack on Blender}, | ||
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howpublished = {Available online}, | howpublished = {Available online}, | ||
− | url = {http:// | + | url = {http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/532.pdf}, |
year = {2008}, | year = {2008}, | ||
− | abstract = { | + | abstract = {Blender is a cryptographic hash function submitted to NIST’s SHA3 competition. We |
− | + | have found a semi-free start collision attack on Blender with trivial complexity. One pair of | |
− | + | semi-free start collision messages with zero initial values is presented.}, | |
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} | } | ||
</bibtex> | </bibtex> |
Revision as of 11:26, 22 December 2008
1 The algorithm
- Author(s): Colin Bradbury
- NIST submission package: Blender.zip
Colin Bradbury - BLENDER: A Proposed New Family of Cryptographic Hash Algorithms
- ,2008
- http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/5/5e/Blender.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Colin Bradbury
Title : BLENDER: A Proposed New Family of Cryptographic Hash Algorithms
In : -
Address :
Date : 2008
2 Cryptanalysis
Craig Newbold - Observations and Attacks On The SHA-3 Candidate Blender
- ,2008
- http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/2/20/Observations_on_Blender.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Craig Newbold
Title : Observations and Attacks On The SHA-3 Candidate Blender
In : -
Address :
Date : 2008
Florian Mendel - Preimage Attack on Blender
- ,2008
- http://ehash.iaik.tugraz.at/uploads/4/48/Blender-preimage.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Florian Mendel
Title : Preimage Attack on Blender
In : -
Address :
Date : 2008
Vlastimil Klima - A near-collision attack on Blender-256
- ,2008
- http://cryptography.hyperlink.cz/BMW/near_collision_blender.pdf
BibtexAuthor : Vlastimil Klima
Title : A near-collision attack on Blender-256
In : -
Address :
Date : 2008
Liangyu Xu - Semi-free start collision attack on Blender